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v“Do these authors despise no one? The book is remarkable for the
open-mindedness and generosity of its interpretations; the authors
have clearly paid as much good attention to those they are
criticizing as to their favorites.”
Daniel Dennett (1993, p. 124) reviewing
Varela, Thompson and Rosch (1991)
“He is surely the kind of philosopher I like to hang out with, but
more important than that, he is the kind of philosopher who is
likely to make a dierence in the eld.”
Francisco Varela (1993, p. 126) reviewing
Dennett (1991)
Abstract
Technological artefacts have, in recent years, invited increasingly intimate
ways of interaction. But surprisingly little attention has been devoted to
how such interactions, like with wearable devices or household robots,
shape our minds, cognitive capacities, and moral character. In this thesis, I
develop an embodied, enactive account of mind–technology interaction
that takes the reciprocal inuence of artefacts on minds seriously. First, I
examine how recent developments in philosophy of technology can inform
the phenomenology of mind–technology interaction as seen through an
enactivist lens. Second, I show how an enactive account of remembering
can improve operationalizations of the memory palace mnemonic through
virtual reality devices. Third, I draw on virtue ethics to argue that an
enactivist approach allows us to better grasp the morally shaping aspects
of artefacts by looking at social robots. Fourth, I fend o an underlying
metaphysical concern about enactivism by arguing that an embodied,
enactive account is compatible with the multiple realization of cognitive
processes. This principle is often seen as a crucial test favouring accounts
such as extended functionalism over enactivism and I argue that some
forms of enactivism pass this test as well. Finally, I conclude by considering
what the future relationship between enactivism and functionalism may
have in store for the study of mind–technology interaction.
Samenvatting (Abstract in Dutch)
Technologische artefacten hebben ons de afgelopen jaren tot steeds in-
tiemere manieren van interactie verleid. Toch is er verrassend weinig
aandacht geschonken aan hoe zulke interacties, zoals met draagbare ap-
paraten en thuisrobots, onze geest, cognitive capaciteiten en ons moreel
karakter vormen. In dit proefschrift ontwikkel ik een belichaamde, en-
actieve benadering van geest–technologieïnteractie die de wederkerige
invloed van artefacten op de geest serieus neemt. Ten eerste onderzoek
ik hoe recente ontwikkelingen in de technieklosoe de fenomenologie
van geest–technologieïnteractie, bekeken vanuit een enactief perspectief,
kunnen informeren. Ten tweede toon ik aan hoe een enactief begrip van
herinneren het operationaliseren van de geheugenpaleistechniek door
middel van virtual reality-apparaten kan verbeteren. Ten derde betoog ik,
op basis van deugdethische overwegingen in onze omgang met sociale
robots, dat een enactieve benadering ons beter in staat stelt de moreel
vormende aspecten van artefacten te begrijpen. Ten vierde weerleg ik een
onderliggend metafysisch probleem voor enactivisme door te betogen dat
een belichaamde enactieve benadering te verenigen is met de meervoudige
realisatie van cognitive processen. Dit principe wordt doorgaans gezien
als een belangrijke proef die voordeel biedt aan uitgebreide vormen van
functionalisme ten opzichte van enactivisme. Ik betoog dat sommige vor-
men van enactivisme ook voor deze proef slagen. Ten slotte overweeg
ik wat de toekomstige relatie tussen enactivisme en functionalisme kan
betekenen voor het bestuderen van geest–technologieïnteractie.
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Preface
I must have built my rst robot when I was about 14 or 15 years old. That
sounds more impressive than it is. In that period, which must have been
around 2001, I managed to convince my parents to nance a subscription
on a Dutch robotics magazine. Each new issue came with a component
to construct your own robot and, as such magazines are wont to do, the
rst one or two issues were freely distributed before subscribers had to
pay a quite hefty fee. Yet I remained subscribed and managed to construct
a cute-looking, blue-domed robot on wheels that happily followed the
ashlight I used to illuminate its surroundings. I have been fascinated by
technology for as long as I can remember, but that moment still stands out
to me as a bit of a revelation: we are able to build things that move around
of their own accord, and do so in a seemingly intelligent manner!
What motivates the present dissertation is my curiosity about not just
technologies, but particularly about how technologies shape our existence
as experiencing, moral, and sometimes even intelligent human beings.
This can be illustrated with a relatively simple example. It is well-known
that George R.R. Martin, author of the A song of ice and re series that
was famously televised as Game of thrones, writes his hulking tomes in
WordStar 4.0 on an old DOS desktop computer without Internet connec-
tion. This ageing machine provides all the tools he needs and none of the
distractions of the modern digital workplace. Martin the writer is deeply
entwined with his tool of choice and would not have it any other way.
Having written the present text, I can understand some of his concerns.
Expanding on this theme, we nd J.R.R. Tolkien, one of Martin’s main
sources of inspiration, relating his feelings about being temporarily de-
prived from using his right hand. In a letter to his publisher Stanley Unwin
dated October 1963, Tolkien laments how he found “not being able to use a
pen or pencil as defeating as the loss of her beak would be to a hen” (letter
xiii
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#248 in The letters of Tolkien). Note how Tolkien specically mentions not
being able to use the hand for writing. As becomes clear from his other
letters, writing was for Tolkien as essential as breathing. But why are their
specic writing implements of such importance to Martin and Tolkien?
Why can’t Martin just use a modern computer and why didn’t Tolkien
rely on a typewriter or friend to write things down?
Philosophy is able to shed light on such questions. Both Richard
Menary (2007b) and Don Ihde (1990, p. 141) discuss the ways in which
specic writing implements not only shape the act of writing – some tools
allow faster writing than others – but actually change the author’s mental
activity and, therefore, the text being written. Coming from a philosophy
of mind perspective, Menary argues that writing is, quite literally, thinking.
Putting words and sentences on a piece of paper allows us to manipulate
them in ways we couldn’t do without the paper, which in turn feeds back
into the writing process. Simply put: I am able to write part of an argument
down and, when I reach the conclusion, restructure some of the original
parts once I am clear on the exact steps involved in the argument.
Coming from a philosophy of technology perspective, Ihde reects
on the dierences between using an old-fashioned dip or fountain pen, a
typewriter, and a modern computer. Each enable dierent writing speeds
and incline the author to dierent styles of editing. A dip pen invites one
to write slowly and leaves room for thinking more carefully about words
while writing. A modern computer, on the other hand, allows one to write
fast and edit at whim. The reections by Menary and Ihde are conrmed in
an empirical study which revealed, among other things, that people who
write with a pen generally think at the level of sentences and paragraphs
while writing, and edit after the text is done. In contrast, authors who
use computers are prone to pause and edit at the individual word level
(Van Waes & Schellens, 2003). In this light, the paradoxical feeling of only
knowing what one wanted to write by the very act of writing it, becomes
more clear. This helps explain why authors such as Martin and Tolkien are
so attached to their specic writing implements: the writing activity itself
would otherwise likely be very dierent, as would the texts produced.
Reecting on dierent types of writing implements may seem like a
fairly innocent exercise, but it reveals something very fundamental about
the nature of our engagements with various technologies. After all, if
xv
merely exchanging a pen for a computer results in a dierent cognitive
process and a dierent text, then to what extent do other, more complex
technologies inuence our thoughts and behaviours? And if our mental and
bodily activities may depend so heavily on the characteristics of specic
technologies, then to what extent do they become part of who we are?
Indeed, many of us make photos of important events in our lives and, after
many years, might not even remember such events if they did not have
access to their photos. This has ethical implications as well. What if a
person passes away and their friend or relative is responsible for going
through their belongings: is the act of throwing away pictures kept by
the deceased an act of memory removal, or perhaps even erasure of that
person?
These are some of the questions with which the present dissertation
engages. I wish for it to shed some light on these matters and clarify, even
if only in part, the dierent ways in which we engage with technologies.
If we are better able to understand such relations, then we are in a bet-
ter position to hold on to human freedom and responsibility in a world
where technologies are not only becoming increasingly complex but also
increasingly invisible.
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Introduction
Cognitive science is changing. It is witnessing a turn towards pragmatic,
action-oriented, and dynamic approaches to cognition and away from
views leaning on representations, computations, and mechanisms (Engel,
Maye, Kurthen & König, 2013; Menary, 2016). Dramatically, philosopher
Andy Clark (2016) says approaches that place context and action centre
stage require us “to abandon the last vestiges of the ‘input–output’ model”
(p. 139). In the present work, I look at the pragmatic turn through the
lens of mind–technology interaction.1 This move secures a double treas-
ure. First, thinking about how minds engage with technologies in light
of the pragmatic turn, helps us reconsider current approaches to cogni-
tion. Second, applying cognitive accounts that are at the vanguard of the
pragmatic turn to cases of mind–technology interaction, helps us to better
understand such types of interaction. These rewards make the present
work of interest both to those working in cognitive science and to those
working in mind–technology interaction, broadly construed.
My investigation of mind–technology interaction targets a crucial
assumption in some prominent theories that attempt to align themselves
with the pragmatic turn. To draw out this assumption, let us look again at
Clark’s input–output model. This model permeates many of the disciplines
which constitute cognitive science, such as philosophy, psychology, cognit-
ive neuroscience and articial intelligence. This is unsurprising, because
the input–output model is fuelled by the idea that our mind works like a
computer. In the words of Paul Thagard (2005), in his Mind: Introduction
1 While terms like ‘human–computer interaction’, ‘human–technology interaction’, or
‘human–robot interaction’ are perhaps more familiar, I deliberately use mind–technology
interaction. Mind–technology interaction, because my research concerns the cognitive
aspects of how we engage with environmental resources, such as technologies. Mind–
technology interaction, because I would like to emphasise the general category of techno-
logical artefacts and not just those artefacts that compute.
1
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to cognitive science: “Many but not all cognitive scientists view thinking as
a kind of computation and use computational metaphors to describe and
explain how people solve problems and learn” (pp. 3–4).2 The computer
metaphor is the assumption I target in the current investigation. It is a
powerful metaphor: amongst its virtues is the concrete and mathematically
precise toolkit that scientists and philosophers have used to study mind
and cognition. However, the adequacy of this metaphor is up for debate
and questioning it has important consequences for how we think about
mind and cognition.
The computer metaphor underlies much recent work in understand-
ing mind–technology interaction. Its most inuential incarnation is that of
functionalism: the philosophical idea that mental states are dened by what
they do and not by what they are made of. Clark’s input–output model is
one form of functionalism. In contrast, the pragmatic turn is exemplied
by the various strands of enactivism: the idea that mind arises out of an
organism’s active and continuing engagement with its environment. These
two schools of thought form the guiding frames within which I examine
mind–technology interaction.
In order to perform this examination, I will do the following. First, I
show that the philosophical theory of functionalism underlies many of
the current debates on mind–technology interaction. Second, I provide
reasons to think that functionalism is not always in the best position to
explain such interactions. Third, I argue that the competing theory of
enactivism is better equipped to help us understand the relation between
mind and technology. In sum, the guiding question motivating the present
dissertation is whether functionalism makes any explanatory contribution
over enactivism within the eld of mind–technology interaction and, po-
tentially, beyond. To situate these terms and steps, I now turn to a famous
example from the philosophical literature on the interaction of mind and
artefact: the case of Otto’s notebook.
2 There is little reason to doubt the communis opinio has changed much since Thagard’s
declaration. A recent announcement for the 2017 meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
reads: “computation can serve as the foundational theory of how people actively process
information in service of control and decision making ... greater eort must be made to
connect cognitive science theories to computational foundations” (cited in Núñez et al.,
2019, p. 7).
3In their classic paper “The extended mind”, Andy Clark and David
Chalmers (1998) take a closer look at how the mind may make use of
environmental resources. They do so by considering a thought experiment
that features two rememberers: Inga and Otto. Inga and Otto are both
looking to visit the Museum of Modern Art while in New York. But whereas
Inga uses her biological memory to recall the museum’s address, Otto,
a suerer of early-onset Alzheimer’s, retrieves it through his notebook.
Otto’s notebook, Clark and Chalmers argue, plays for Otto the same role
that memory plays for Inga (p. 13). In it, Otto stores the things he would like
to remember and his daily routine depends systematically, not incidentally,
on his writing – similar to how Inga depends on her biological memory.
Since Otto’s notebook is playing the same role as Inga’s biological memory
and because we consider Inga’s biological memory to be part of her mind,
saying that Otto’s notebook is not part of Otto’s mind would be a case
of neural chauvinism. Thus we have the extended mind thesis: that, in
principle, the physical underpinnings of the mind may sometimes extend
beyond the skull and skin.
While an excellent paper, that generated many research programmes
on extended cognition, the proposal it puts forward is not without aws.
One important aspect, which remains underdeveloped from a mind–tech-
nology interaction perspective, is the fact that there are dierent ways
to interface with technological artefacts and that those dierences funda-
mentally matter. This is reason for Helena De Preester (2011) to warn us
against equating Otto and Inga all too easily, arguing that, because “Inga
has a stronger ownership over the informational items in her memory than
Otto, and ... therefore the information in her memory functions dierently
from the information Otto has in his notebook” (p. 134). The dierent levels
of ownership are themselves based on the dierent phenomenologies that
Inga and Otto presumably have of the ways they bodily engage with their
respective memories.
The role of the body is crucial if we want to be in a position to under-
stand interfacing with artefacts and De Preester grabs hold of the right
thread in this conceptual knot. But she is pulling in the wrong direction. If
we are to untangle the problem, we should not follow Clark and Chalmers’
lingo of “informational items” being accessed from storage, whether biolo-
gical or otherwise. I take a cue here from Tom Froese (2014) who suggests
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that “current symbolic computer interfaces are a source of alienation be-
cause their underlying principles are inherently alien to those of embodied
life and mind” (p. 555). Though not a computer interface, Otto’s notebook
is vulnerable to the same critique. While interacting with artefacts through
symbolic representations is certainly one way of interfacing, it need not be
the only one. More fundamentally and perhaps paradoxically, interaction
through symbolic representations might not even be best explained in
terms of a computational theory of mind which puts information pick-up
and processing at the base of cognition, as such theories have troubles
accounting for the dierent roles the body plays. This is what I aim to
show in the rest of the present dissertation.
Why is the notion of information processing central to many of the
debates on extended cognition? This is due, I think, to the close connec-
tions between the extended mind thesis and the philosophical theory of
functionalism. Functionalism is the textbook framework for understanding
minds in analytic philosophy and cognitive science (Churchland, 2005;
Brook, 2009). Since its (re-)conception in the 1960s, it has developed into
many and sometimes contradictory shapes so it is understandable that
Thomas Polger (2004) reports that “[v]arieties of functionalism are as var-
ied as ngerprints but not nearly so constant” (p. 71). Bearing this complex
history in mind, we may say that to a rst and rough approximation func-
tionalism describes mental states not by what they are made of (e.g., neural
states), but by what they do. In a traditional form of functionalism, mental
states are cast as computations over input, like sensory representations,
which lawfully and structurally result in output, like motor actions. In an
oft-repeated credo: “the mind is to the brain, as software is to hardware”
(for a recent iteration see Piccinini, 2010). This mental manipulation of
representations is what gives rise to the idea of mind as an information
processor (Harman, 1988; Wilson, 1994).
The bridge between the extended mind thesis and functionalism rests
on what Clark and Chalmers have dubbed the Parity Principle. This prin-
ciple can be seen as a rule-of-thumb to determine when the mind extends:
“[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recog-
nising as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so
we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8).
5Now, recall that functionalism explains mental states as requiring law-like,
causal relations between systemic inputs and outputs. However, there is no
need to understand these relations as necessarily being instantiated inside
skull and skin. Indeed, functionalism does not even assume physicalism:
witness Hilary Putnam (1967), one of functionalism’s initial architects,
exclaim how the doctrine “is not incompatible with dualism!” (p. 436). This
theoretical exibility leads Michael Wheeler (2015) to say that “function-
alism plausibly provides a theoretical backdrop for the operation of the
parity principle” (p. 160). It seems that the possibility of minds extending
is a built-in feature of functionalism.
We are now in a better position to see just why it is “a common move
in the literature to link [extended mind] in some way to ... functionalism”
(Wheeler, 2015, p. 160). Both Clark and Wheeler have, in a formal bond
between the two ideas, advocated a position Clark christened extended
functionalism (Clark, 2008a; Wheeler, 2010a, 2010b, 2017). With the advent
of the extended mind thesis in discussions on mind–technology interaction,
its functionalist credentials have entered those debates as well (Aydin,
2012, 2015). Whether or not these functionalist commitments best serve
discussions on mind–technology interaction in cognitive science is, as I
argued earlier, a live question and, given the staying power of the extended
mind thesis (Gallagher, 2018), an important one. To assess the viability of
functionalism in debates on mind and technology, it is useful to compare
it with a rival theory of mind.
A few years before the extended mind paper appeared, Francisco
Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch (1991) presented the enactive
approach to mind and cognition in their book The embodied mind. Inspired
by work on self-producing or ‘autopoietic’ systems in molecular biology,
the phenomenological tradition, and Buddhist ideas on the mutual de-
pendence of cognition and the experienced world, enactivism understands
mind as arising from an organism’s active participation with the envir-
onment it’s coupled with. In contrast with more traditional functionalist
programmes, Thompson (2007) proposes that the nervous system is to
be understood as an autonomous dynamic system which creates its own
coherent patterns: the “nervous system does not process information in the
computationalist sense, but creates meaning” (p. 13). Furthermore, where
extended functionalism allows for minds to extend sometimes, enactiv-
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ism holds that basic forms of cognition always have such reach (Hutto,
Kirchho & Myin, 2014).
The emphasis on cognition as depending on active bodily engagement
with an organism’s environment and its inherently extensive nature puts
enactivism in a better starting position than functionalism to explain the
role of the body in mind–technology interaction. However, enactivism
faces its own challenge as pointed out by Ezequiel Di Paolo (2009) when
he admits that the “more interesting and forward-looking themes intro-
duced by the [extended mind] approach, and towards which enactivism
must still develop, include the problem space of technical individuation
and technological networks that bootstrap the generation of cognitive
identities” (p. 20). It is my hope that the present dissertation will make
contributions to this development by providing an enactivist alternative
to the extended functionalist tale of how minds and artefacts interact.
Some caveats have to be made regarding my depiction of functional-
ism up to this point. First, I must emphasise that Clark is, and has been, a
staunch advocate of the importance of the body in cognitive science and,
in his own words, would be horried “to nd myself suspected ... of now
believing that the body didn’t matter and the mind was something ethereal
and distinct” (Clark, 2003, p. 189). Yet, good intentions notwithstanding,
this might be exactly what he is doing. With the provocative accusation
of ‘body snatching’, Shaun Gallagher (2015) draws attention to a recent
trend by cognitive scientists who, in an attempt to march alongside the
banner of embodied cognition, have inltrated research programmes on
embodied cognition and relegated any relevance the body might have to
bodily representations inside the brain. Gallagher does not mention Clark
in this colourful analogy, but Lawrence Shapiro (2019) does when he criti-
cises Clark for focusing too much on the body as a computational resource
instead of as a shaper of cognition. Regardless, the treatment of the body
in extended functionalism deserves closer scrutiny and will receive it in
Chapter 2.
The second caveat on my discussion of extended functionalism is that
I have so far neglected to mention the evolution of the extended mind
thesis through dierent ‘waves’. The dening feature of the rst wave
of extended cognition was the Parity Principle, and in the second wave
this principle was joined by the Complementarity Principle. Where the
7former focused on similar cognitive functions being performed at dierent
locations, the latter creates space for the idea that “dierent components of
the overall (enduring or temporary) system can play quite dierent roles
and have dierent properties while coupling in collective and complement-
ary contributions to exible thinking and acting” (Sutton, 2010, p. 194).
These two principles are not mutually exclusive. The second wave signies
a change towards a more distributed type of thinking about cognition.
It seems that the third wave, currently still only anticipated (Kirchho,
2012), will take this even further, with Gallagher (2018) suggesting that
this wave may strive to integrate ideas about the brain as a predictive
engine – the so-called ‘predictive processing’ paradigm – and enactivism
into one coherent framework.
It is with the suggestion of integrating enactivism and extended
mind that we have stumbled upon a deep question about the relation-
ship between functionalism and enactivism. If integrating enactivism and
extended mind is a live option, and, as we have seen earlier, extended
mind and functionalism are seen as star-crossed, does that imply that func-
tionalism and enactivism are on some level compatible with each other?
Will the diametrical opposition I have presented between these two rivals
collapse? In his introduction to the 2010a volume on the extended mind,
Richard Menary seems to think such compatibility is an option: “It may
turn out that a liberal functionalist account of cognition will provide a
way of determining which manipulations are part of cognition and which
are not, in which case there may not be any great tension between the
enactive and functionalist approaches to the extended mind” (pp. 21–22).
But he concludes by saying that the details of such a conjunction are not
yet explicated.
Interestingly, proponents of both functionalism (Wheeler, 2010a, 2017)
and enactivism (Di Paolo, 2009; Thompson & Stapleton, 2009) have denied
that compatibility between the two approaches is possible – though they
have done so for dierent reasons. Wheeler (2017) has gone so far as to
say that extended functionalism is explanatorily superior to enactivism,
particularly the branch of enactivism known as extensive enactivism. How-
ever, in recent work, Gualtiero Piccinini (2008, 2010, 2015) has taken steps
towards disentangling functionalism from its traditional commitments to
representational, computational, or mechanical theories of cognition. This
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raises the question whether a pure version of functionalism is compat-
ible with enactivist theories. One possibility is that enactivist theories in
fact entail such a pure functionalism. If so, the functionalist framework
must feature, despite appearances, in any such pragmatic approaches to
cognition. This would mean that the denial of compatibility is based on a
confusion of pure functionalism with a computational, representational,
or mechanical account of cognition.
Even if some form of functionalism is entailed by enactivism, it leaves
open the question of whether extended functionalism, if cast in the guise
of a puried functionalist theory, makes an explanatory contribution to
enactivism, contra Wheeler. Responding to this question will be the job of
the remainder of this dissertation and I will do so by developing an enact-
ivist account of mind–technology interaction and applying this account
to specic instances of human–technology relations.
In Chapter 1, I engage with current discussions in the eld of philo-
sophy of technology. The postphenomenological approach is an important
school of thought in contemporary philosophy of technology (Ihde, 1990;
Verbeek, 2005; Rosenberger & Verbeek, 2015). Unlike classic phenomeno-
logy, postphenomenology does not see technological artefacts as an ali-
enating factor between subject and world, but instead understands such
artefacts as mediating between the two. For example, the discovery of
ultrasonic images allows expecting parents to see the developing fetus.
However, being able to see into the womb also confronts the parents with
new ethical questions, such as when the fetus displays a painful chronic
illness. Postphenomenology aims to clarify and structure the dierent
force-elds – surrounding subjects, artefacts, and the wider world – that
result from technological mediation.
There have been some attempts at converging extended cognition
thinking and postphenomenology. Some have argued that both approaches
are irreconcilable, as extended cognition assumes a subject–object dicho-
tomy while postphenomenology does not (Kiran & Verbeek, 2010; Aydin,
2012, 2015). Others have attempted to show that extended cognition think-
ing is not vulnerable to such a critique (Heersmink, 2012). Enactivism simil-
arly aims to understand mind and world as co-constitutive. Given that both
enactivism and postphenomenology can count classic phenomenology
amongst their pedigree, this will not be a surprise. My aim in Chapter 1,
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framework to postphenomenology than extended functionalism. I do this
by looking at the categorisation of dierent human–technology relations
that have been put forward by postphenomenologists (Verbeek, 2008). This
will provide enactivists with a robust theory of artefact engagement, while
at the same time linking postphenomenology to an empirical cognitive
theory.
Virtual reality has recently drawn the attention of some prominent
philosophers of mind, as it may allow the investigation of scenarios which
could previously only be imagined (Chalmers, 2017; Metzinger, 2018). One
area where virtual reality opens up interesting lines of research is that of
memory and mnemonics (Michaelian, 2016; Heersmink, 2018). In Chapter 2,
I take a closer look at one of the most enduring and powerful mnemonics:
the memory palace. Because mastering the memory palace takes a lot
of commitment and practice, cognitive scientists have tried to support
the technique through virtual reality, hoping to improve its accessibility.
However, such operationalizations have so far not yielded results which
can compete with traditional memory palace usage. I propose that cur-
rent approaches to the virtual memory palace are based on an extended
functionalist framework and, consequently, do not suciently account
for the user’s active bodily engagement in the memory palace. Instead, I
develop an enactive account of the memory palace and recommend how
future virtual operationalizations may benet from design choices inspired
by my enactive proposal. If my design recommendations are taken in by
cognitive scientists and hold rm, we have further support for thinking
enactively about memory in general.
Enactivism may have important ethical implications for how we
think about ourselves. Chapters 3 and 4 form a pair that examines these
implications within the context of social robotics. The rst of these deals
with the issue of sex robots. Though sex robots as such do not yet exist
and are little more than sex dolls, manufacture of such devices is looming
on the horizon. Unsurprisingly, major debates have erupted in society and
academia about the use and implications of such robots. I propose that the
framework of virtue ethics is well-disposed to examine the consequences of
sex robots for human moral character. In doing so, I argue against current
instrumentalist approaches to sex robot use. A contribution of the chapter
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to the eld of social robotics is that it suggests that, within supervised,
therapeutic scenarios, it may be useful to implement robots with consent
modules. This suggestion is not without risks, but the topic nonetheless
deserves careful consideration before it is dismissed a priori. The chapter
concludes with a reection on the implications of sex robots for human
autonomy and responsibility.
Because of the situated nature of virtue ethics, it is particularly of
interest to enactive cognition researchers. Chapter 4 therefore immediately
follows upon the issues raised in the previous and investigates the possibil-
ity of an enactive self and moral character. Situationists argue that humans
can never be truly virtuous, saying that moral character is not consistent
and overly dependent on environmental factors. I target their assumption
that character and environment need be seen as strictly separate and de-
fend the proposal that social robots can not only cultivate vice but also
virtue. I do this by extending the concept of moral character to allow for
the incorporation of environmental resources. I consider both extended
functionalist and enactivist accounts of such an extended self, concluding
that the latter provides a fundamentally more robust alternative. Thinking
enactively about the self and moral character not only gives us ground for
concluding social robots may support the cultivation of virtue, but also
provides a novel answer to the situationist challenge to virtue ethics.
Finally, Chapter 5 examines a lingering issue between functionalism
and enactivism, namely the principle of multiple realization. Because of
enactivism’s sensitivity to the concrete embodiment of cognitive acts,
some are inclined to think that enactivism and multiple realizability do
not play well together (Myin & Zahnoun, 2018). However, such consid-
erations turn on an assumption that multiple realization is dependent
on the conception of cognition as information-processing. I argue that
there is an understanding of multiple realization that considers cognitive
processes as potentially realized in cognitive systems, like humans in their
own habitats, that systematically incorporate environmental resources.
Contrary to what is often claimed, I argue that enactivism is compatible
with multiple realizability and conclude that this principle thus need not
give functionalism any decisive advantage over its competitor.
The internal logic of the present work is as follows. Broadly speak-
ing the following chapters are connected as follows: Chapter 1 provides
11
a broad framework for thinking of mind-technology interaction as en-
active. It connects, on a general level, the philosophy of mind and the
philosophy of technology, and establishes the viability of an embodied
approach to mind–technology interaction by drawing on phenomenolo-
gically inspired developments in both elds. Its major conclusions are that
mind-technology interaction need not be understood in terms of informa-
tional exchange and that such interactions are co-shaping both agent and
technology design.
This framework then informs discussions in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, where
I apply the distinctions drawn in the rst chapter to concrete case-studies.
In Chapter 2, I focus on a specic mental process – namely memory –
in relation to a specic technology – namely virtual reality. By showing
how virtual interactions can be understood in embodied, enactive terms
instead of information-processing ones, I not only provide proof of the
pudding prepared in Chapter 1, but also aim to illustrate the ability of my
framework to inspire technology design and cognitive science. Similarly,
Chapters 3 and 4 together investigate the ethical implications of my frame-
work. As I advance a theory of mind-technology interaction that takes the
reciprocal inuence of agent and environment seriously, some immediate
points of ethical interest arise. For instance, if agent and environment
are as intimately linked as I advocate in Chapter 1, moral responsibility
cannot be thought to solely reside on the side of the agent. This calls for
a ethical theory that is sensitive to the concrete and unique contexts in
which moral acts take place. Virtue ethics is such a theory, as it reserves a
prominent place for the way moral acts shape a person’s character. Within
the context of current debates on social robotics, the ethical implications
of my framework are therefore made explicit in Chapters 3 and 4.
With the middle chapters securing the positive support for my ar-
gument, the fth and nal chapter aims to pre-empt a potential critique
to it. The augmentation of postphenomenology by its alliance to the en-
active approach puts it in a stronger position of relevance for cognitive
science. With this, however, postphenomenology inherits a potential prob-
lem that has faced enactivists. Namely, if cognition is to be understood as
embodied and enactive, as I claim in Chapter 1, it stands to lose the ability
of information-processing cognitive approaches to understand cognitive
processes as potentially implemented in dierent media. In Chapter 5, I
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present this potential issue and show that my embodied, enactive frame-
work can claim a similar ability to carve out the instantiation of a cognitive
process in distinct materials
Current debates about wide cognition have been intense and recent
years have seen a veritable explosion of literature on the topic. Inevitably,
this means that the present work cannot investigate all possible avenues
related to its main aim. Discussions about niche construction and scaf-
folding (Sterelny, 2010), cognitive integration (Menary, 2007a), cognitive
archeology (Malafouris, 2013; Ransom, 2019), feminist theory (Ihde, 2002;
Brancazio, 2019), and predictive processing (Hohwy, 2013; Clark, 2016) are
all viable candidates for future dialogue partners with the present work.
But concessions to the scope of the dissertation had to be made and I have
attempted to restrain in-depth theoretical discussions to a critical pairing
of extended functionalism and enactivism. I will leave it to future work to
rectify any omissions this may have caused.
Though wide approaches to cognition are the talk of the day, not
everyone has jumped on the train. Such thinkers that remain sceptical of
cognition as extended or enactive argue that there is little to be gained
from an explanation of mind as realized in part by environmental factors
(Adams & Aizawa, 2001, 2008; Rupert, 2004). Wide cognition theorists have
responded both with theoretical and empirical counterarguments (Menary,
2010b; Wagman & Chemero, 2014). This is an important discussion but
as this dissertation is situated at the vanguard of discussions about wide
cognition, it will not engage with these fundamental issues and instead
assume that some form of wide cognition is a live possibility for theories
of mind.
The methodology of the second part of this dissertation is likely
somewhat dierent from what would commonly be expected in the context
of analytic philosophy. This is deliberate. Inspiration for this methodology
hails from philosophers who closely engage with empirical research and
reach across the disciplinary boundaries within and outside of philosophy.
Some of my philosophical heroes in this regard are Daniel Dennett and
Andy Clark. My attention was recently drawn to a paper by Eric Schliesser
(2019), in which he adopts the term ‘synthetic philosophy’. His description
is worth quoting in full:
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By ‘synthetic philosophy’ I mean a style of philosophy that
brings together insights, knowledge, and arguments from the
special sciences with the aim to oer a coherent account of
complex systems and connect these to a wider culture or other
philosophical projects (or both). Synthetic philosophy may,
in turn, generate new research in the special sciences, a new
science connected to the framework adopted in the synthetic
philosophy, or new projects in philosophy. (pp. 1–2)
It is my intention that the present dissertation can be read in the spirit
of synthetic philosophy as described in the quotation above.
The chapters in this work have been written as independent publish-
able papers and indeed some of them have appeared in academic journals.
The publication status of each chapter is signalled at the start of the chapter
where an abstract for that chapter can also be found in the style of an
academic paper. While all chapters are, naturally, thematically connected
and deal with related issues, some variation in tone and presentation has
been unavoidable, particularly in those chapters that were co-authored. I
have striven to keep the format of the chapters as consistent as possible. I
trust this will not cause much inconvenience for the reader and apologise
for any potential instances where it does.
My hope is that the present dissertation makes a convincing case for
two points. First, that it shows how, in the domain of mind–technology
interaction, an enactive approach to cognition helps inform and move
forward some of the current discussions in that eld. In particular, I have
aimed to contribute to the design of new technological artefacts, such
as virtual reality devices. Second, that it spurs on discussion between
functionalists and enactivists about the future of their respective research
programmes. Progress is often driven by opposition and I would like to
see functionalists pick up the ball that I have kicked into their camp.
Abstract
In this paper, we evaluate the pragmatic turn towards embodied, enactive thinking
in cognitive science, in the context of recent empirical research on the memory
palace technique. The memory palace is a powerful method for remembering yet
it faces two problems. First, cognitive scientists are currently unable to clarify its
ecacy. Second, the technique faces signicant practical challenges to its users.
Virtual reality devices are sometimes presented as a way to solve these practical
challenges, but currently fall short of delivering on that promise. We address
both issues in this paper. First, we argue that an embodied, enactive approach to
memory can better help us understand the eectiveness of the memory palace.
Second, we present design recommendations for a virtual memory palace. Our
theoretical proposal and design recommendations contribute to solving both
problems and provide reasons for preferring an embodied, enactive account over
an information-processing treatment of the memory palace.
This chapter is published, in a slightly modied form, as: Peeters, A. & Segundo-
Ortin, M. (2019). Misplacing memories? An enactive approach to the virtual
memory palace. Consciousness and Cognition, 76, 102834. Anco Peeters is the main
author of this chapter, having authored the rst three sections, introduction, and
conclusion, and taking the lead on structuring the argument. Anco Peeters and
Miguel Segundo Ortin co-wrote the fourth section. Both authors contributed to
polishing the text. Miguel Segundo Ortin permits the inclusion of the chapter in
the present thesis.
Miguel Segundo Ortin
October 15, 2019
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Chapter 2
Misplacing memories in virtual
reality
“The best aid to clearness of memory consists in orderly arrangement”
Cicero, De oratore, 2.86.354, trans. E.W.B. Sutton
Though the memory palace technique, a mnemonic making clever use
of places and images, is enjoying newfound attention by researchers on
virtual reality (VR), its use goes back centuries. According to one famous
story, Giordano Bruno, a Napolitan philosopher and inuential memory
palace master, earned himself an accusation of plagiarism while presenting
at Oxford in 1583. Apparently, one attentive Oxford don did not appreciate
that Bruno, in a top-o-the-head lecture, recited long text passages from a
contemporary scholar without a reference (Rowland, 2008, p. 146). Bruno’s
mnemonic use was careless, yet his memory feats remain impressive. Cog-
nitive scientists have been trying to make use of the memory palace more
accessible through visualising the technique’s places and images in VR,
but their eorts have so far yielded underwhelming results. In this paper,
we address the issues surrounding recent attempts at operationalizing the
memory palace through VR and we present a new and improved way of
understanding the technique. Our proposal is inspired both by going back
to the technique’s roots and by insights from embodied, enactive cognitive
science and should help towards solving the issues mentioned.
The main problem with mastering the memory palace technique is
the time and eort involved. The technique takes long-term practice, in
a suitable environment, and requires creative imagination. This explains
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why, given the strength of the technique, its use in education and training
practices is not more prevalent. To increase accessibility of the memory
palace, researchers have attempted to operationalize its use through VR
devices. So far, it has proved hard to gain similar levels of remembering
with the use of such devices when compared to traditional mnemonics.
To make steps towards solving this issue, we propose to consider
the diculties in the translation of the memory palace into VR against
the background of the so-called ‘pragmatic turn’ in cognitive science.
The pragmatic turn signals a move towards conceiving of cognition as
dynamic, embodied and enactive and away from cognition as information-
processing (Engel, 2010; Engel et al., 2013). Reframing how we think about
the cognitive underpinnings of memory will help in the design of the
virtual memory palace.
What is the advantage of examining the memory palace from the
perspective of embodied, enacted cognition? We provide two related in-
centives. The rst stems from the observation that current cognitivist
investigations into the workings of the technique, which are based on
the information-processing paradigm, have not shed sucient light on
why it is so powerful, as we will elaborate in the next section.1 This opens
the door to the consideration of an alternative paradigm. The second and
related reason is that the memory palace, because it leans heavily on
memory scaolding through environmental resources, calls for a cognitive
framework which places the role of the body in the environment front and
centre.
Keeping in mind the pragmatic turn, our paper develops as follows. In
Section 2.1, we will examine current cognitivist approaches to the memory
palace technique and show how they are unable to explain its dynamics,
concluding that there is, as we call it, an Explanation Problem. Following
this, we will argue in Section 2.2 that current attempts to operationalize
the memory palace in virtual reality fall short, because they depend on cog-
nitivist understandings of the technique. Call this the Operationalization
1 We take inspiration from a recent critique on symbolic interfacing with augmented reality
devices. Raja and Calvo (2017) argue that instead of programming augmented reality
glasses (like Google Glass) to navigate spaces using symbols and icons like arrows and
text (cf. Clark, 2003, p. 52), such devices would instead function better if they leveraged
their user’s sensorimotor capacities through changes in brightness. Froese (2014) provides
a similar, generalized critique of symbolic interfaces.
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Problem. Because addressing the Operationalization Problem rst requires
addressing the Explanation Problem, we turn to the latter in Section 2.3,
where we argue that an enactive account of the memory palace captures
the technique better than its cognitivist rivals. This sets the stage for Sec-
tion 2.4, in which we address the Operationalization Problem by presenting
design recommendations for designers of virtual memory palaces based on
our proposed enactive account. In doing so, we will rely on inuential the-
ories in embodied cognition, such as ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979;
Chemero, 2009). We conclude with some considerations on the application
of the virtual memory palace in educational settings and for future lines
of research.
2.1 The memory palace in cognitive science
Much of our understanding of the memory palace is derived from historical
sources. In her titular and seminal book on the art of memory, historian
Frances Yates (1966) develops a now classic account of the memory palace.
Drawing on instructions by Roman rhetoricians like Cicero and their fur-
ther development by Bruno, she explains that the memory palace strategy
rests on two pillars: loci (places) and images.2
A locus is characterised as part of a spacious environment with dis-
tinct features. Classic examples of such environments include large and
varied buildings with decorations inside, such as churches and cathedrals.
Environmental parts which qualify as loci are usually those that stand out
when one would take a familiar route through the environment, such as
a gargoyle statue at the entrance, or a niche under a window. Loci and
images play a role during both the learning and the recalling phase of the
technique. In the learning phase, one moves through the building (prefer-
ably physically) and has to imagine placing images of that which has to be
remembered at specic locations in and around the building. Then, during
the recalling phase, one imagines moving through the building and gets
triggered by the images positioned there to reconstruct the memory. It
is advised to use vivid and personally resonating images for maximum
recall-eect.
2 In fact, the technique is often called method of loci (MOL), though this is a bit of a
misnomer as it puts undue focus on the rst of the two pillars.
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To illustrate the use of the technique and draw out some important
aspects, let us imagine the following. While applying the technique to
a talk on robot ethics, I choose the Sydney Opera House as my locus of
choice. During the learning phase, I physically move around the Sydney
Opera House. Initially I imagine a porter at the entrance who holds a
copy of Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot. Moving on, I approach the Opera House’s
wardrobe, where I imagine Aristotle arguing with Immanuel Kant while
Jeremy Bentham hands his head to a robot attending the cloakroom. I
continue to move around and create and place images for every part of my
talk. When I am ready to present the talk I enter the recalling phase. During
that phase, Asimov’s book serves to remind me that I need to start my talk
by presenting the three laws of robotics, both as an introductory ‘hook’ and
to mark them as a starting point in robot ethics. The image of Aristotle and
Kant arguing triggers me to say that virtue ethics and deontology might
have something to say on robotics, though both theories are not dominant
in current discussions. This is where the image of Bentham comes in, as
it cues me to say that utilitarianism is currently the dominant theory in
debates on robot ethics. The vividness and personal quality of the images
will help me remember, and placing them at specic positions in the locus
will help me to order my recollection. The use of personal imagery in
combination with the scaolding of memories through environmental
cues are the dening features of the memory palace.
An impressive study by Eleanor Maguire and colleagues (2002), on
the functional and neurological dierences between normal and high-
performing memorizers, shows that the memory palace technique is much
alive today. Of the high-performing memorizers, drawn from a pool of
participants in the World Memory Championships, 90% report using the
technique for some or even all of their tasks. The goal of the study was to
capture the possible causes that could dierentiate superior memorizers
from normal ones. As expected, the superior memorizers performed sig-
nicantly better in tests on both working and long-term verbal memory.
No dierences in terms of general intellect or brain structure between
the two groups were found. However, functional brain-imaging showed
that the superior memorizers, in contrast with the controls, had consist-
ent higher activation levels in the medial parietal cortex, retrosplenial
cortex, and the right posterior hippocampus. These regions are “known
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to be important for memory, and are implicated in spatial memory and
navigation” (p. 93). Unsurprisingly, these brain areas showed increased
activity during the learning phase of the task. Thus, Maguire and col-
leagues conclude that mnemonics like the memory palace, which they
dened as “strategies for encoding information with the sole purpose of
making it more memorable” (p. 93), constitute the main explanatory cause
for the performative dierence between superior and normal memorizers.
The memory palace technique provides the “top participants of the annual
World Memory Championships ... the ability to memorize hundreds of
words, digits, or other abstract information units” and is therefore called
the “most prominent mnemonic technique” (Dresler et al., 2017, p. 1227).
As of yet, there is no single explanation for why the memory palace
technique is so eective. There is nonetheless a suspicion that the “addi-
tional motor imagery aspect is likely the reason the method of loci has
been found to be particularly eective—a connection that has not been
previously made” (Madan & Singhal, 2012, p. 220). This in contrast to
other memory strategies which often solely depend on visual imagery.
However, it is unclear exactly why motor imagery in combination with
visual imagery would explain the eectiveness of the memory palace as a
cognitive technique.
Moving further down these lines of thought, Martin Dresler and
colleagues (2017) hypothesize that with the memory palace technique
“abstract and unrelated information units are transformed into concrete
and related information patterns that can more easily be processed by
memory-related brain structures, such as the hippocampus” (p. 1232). But
what does it mean to say that “concrete and related information patterns”
are more easily processed by brain structures? What does the memory
palace technique do which transforms a random deck of playing cards
from “abstract and unrelated information units” into “concrete and related
information patterns”? This transformation seems to presuppose two types
of information: abstract and concrete. Are there such dierent kinds, and,
if so, why is concrete information more easily digested? We will take a
closer look at this issue in Section 2.3.
The relation between, on the one hand, Yates’ account of the memory
palace as deeply dependent on both the environment for structure and
the individual for creating images, and, on the other, the information-
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processing paradigm of the previously discussed experiments, remains
underdeveloped. The support of the environment is, in this paradigm,
dened as the ordering of information units which are processed by a cog-
nizer’s brain. But that this reordering allows for more ecient information
processing is, at best, in need of further explanation, or, as we will argue,
a fundamentally awed approach to the understanding of the technique.
Let us call this issue the Explanation Problem.
2.2 The virtual memory palace
The Explanation Problem, as we argue in the next section, lies at the root
of why eorts at making the memory palace accessible through VR devices,
are not yielding results comparable to traditional memory palace practice.
Why is there a need for a ‘virtual memory palace’? Memory theorists
have observed that the “primary aw of mnemonics is that eective use
often requires extensive practice” (Madan, 2014, p. 3). And, specically
in the case of the memory palace, not only does it take practice but it
also takes time to familiarize oneself with a large and spacious building
and to translate what one wants to remember into images which can
then be placed in and around that building. Moreover, the learning phase
can be extra problematic for someone who may not always have ready
access to a locus that ts the described purpose. Large, easily accessible
buildings t for practice are after all not always available when one wants
to, for instance, practise and memorize a talk. Furthermore, the creating-
and-placing-the-images phase of the memory palace technique depends
on having a creative imagination to come up with evocative pictures
which translate to whatever it is one would like to remember. So while
the memory palace is acknowledged as a powerful mnemonic technique,
potential users are often hesitant to go through the eort of learning it.
Virtual reality technologies might hold an answer to the previously
outlined challenges. Virtual environments can be tailor-made for and read-
ily accessible to the memorizer and, when a database of (personalizable)
three-dimensional models is provided, the creation of a tting image for a
certain idea in a speech would not be so complicated. The time it takes to
practise the mnemotic would also decrease when a virtual environment is
available, as there is no need to physically travel to a suitable environment
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or spend time conjuring up an imagined one. In the words of Thomas Jund,
Antonio Capobianco and Frédéric Larue (2016), given “its intrinsic spatial
nature, VR seems to oer the perfect technology devices to implement ...
[the memory palace]. Not only [does] it allow ... immersive exploration
of any given architectural environment, but it also provides rich sensory
cues (spatial contiguity, optic ow, self-directed navigation)” (p. 533). In
theory, virtual reality seems to be made, as it were, for the memory palace
technique.
Early research on investigating the memory palace through the lens
of virtual reality aimed to establish whether virtual environments can
support the memory palace technique as well as conventional, physical
environments do. In an initial and exploratory study, Eric Fassbender and
Wolfgang Heiden (2006) found that participants who interacted with a
virtual environment through the use of a personal computer and desktop
monitor remembered images from that virtual environment better than
words from a sheet of paper. This study is limited because dierent types
of items were compared – images with words – in a within-subject design
without randomisation, and there was no between-subject comparison that
compared the virtual memory palace to a conventional one. Furthermore,
more immersive interfaces than a desktop computer monitor are now
available for a consumer market. Higher levels of immersion in virtual
environments, specically in terms of eld of vision, improve performance
on memorization (Ragan, Sowndararajan, Kopper & Bowman, 2010). This
shows that it is preferable to use, for example, a head-mounted display
(HMD), rather than a desktop computer monitor to interface with a virtual
environment (see also Huttner & Robra-Bissantz, 2016).
In a foundational study on the virtual memory palace, Eric Legge
and colleagues (2012) addressed the question of whether the memory
palace technique works as well with aid from a virtual environment as
from a physical one. In order to test this, the experimenters assigned
participants to three groups: a traditional memory palace group, a virtual
memory palace group, and a control group. All participants rst practised
on a memory task, recalling lists of words, then moved through a virtual
environment, and nally performed another memory task similar to the
rst. The rst two groups were asked to use the memory palace on the
second task, with the former imagining familiar place like their home and
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the latter imagining the virtual environment just before encountered. The
third group were not given a specic strategy to use.
The results of Legge and colleagues’ (2012) research conrm that a
virtual environment does not perform worse than a conventional space.
However, at least two critical remarks can be made about the study. First,
the participants in the study were not present in the virtual environment
during the learning phase of the memory task. Instead, they were shown
the virtual environment for ve minutes and those in the virtual memory
palace group were then asked to use their memory of the virtual space for
their task. Hence, the study does not speak of how eective the memory
palace technique could be when the whole learning phase is performed in
a virtual environment. Second, the level of immersion in the virtual envir-
onment was again quite low: the environment was shown on a desktop
monitor and movement occurred by means of mouse and keyboard. This
runs counter to the theory of the conventional memory palace where an
active, bodily involvement from the memorizer, in terms of navigation and
image placement in the loci, is supposed.
In an eort to make the virtual memory palace a more immediate and
immersive experience, Jund et al. (2016) present a study in which parti-
cipants engaged with a virtual environment by means of an HMD that
provided a stereoscopic image. Three types of environments were presen-
ted. In the rst, participants were sequentially and briey shown items for
remembering in the same frontal virtual position, without spatial cues. In
the second, participants were sequentially shown items to remember, with
each item briey appearing next to the location of the previous item in
the virtual environment. No further spatial cues were given. The rst two
conditions were categorised as ‘egocentric’. In the third, participants were
guided through a virtual apartment with nine dierent rooms. In this third
condition, categorised as ‘allocentric’, participants used a passive naviga-
tion technique: they were moved along a preprogrammed path and could
only move forward by pressing a key. Jund and colleagues were surprised
to nd that the egocentric conditions resulted in better memorization than
the allocentric condition. In a follow-up experiment, they adjusted the
third condition and found that participants performed signicantly better
when using a virtual environment of a familiar building. We do not think
this result is surprising as per Yates’ (1966) suggestion that the memorizer
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should use a building which is intimately familiar to them. In the next
sections, we argue that an essential cognitive part of the memory palace
technique is the training of a cognizer’s memory in such a way that it
allows for eortless re-imagining of the building in question. In a manner
of speaking, such a memorizer would carry the building with them, though
we emphasise this should not be understood representationally. However,
even with this performance improvement on the allocentric condition,
Jund and colleagues found that this condition still did worse than the
egocentric ones.
We point out two likely aspects which may help explain the poorer
results in the allocentric condition when compared to the egocentric ones
in the study by Jund et al. (2016). Both gure in the learning phase of
the memorization process. First, the participants could only indicate the
moment of movement, upon which they were passively moved along a pre-
set path. Second, the participants were presented with images, rather than
given the opportunity to create and actively place images in the virtual
environment. Both aspects signify the passive relation of the participant to
the employed environment and this runs counter to the active anchoring as
described by Yates (1966). Jund and colleagues seem to agree, at least on the
rst point, when they conclude that “the navigation technique and sensory
cues associated with displacement might be of primary importance when
it comes to use spatial information to support memorization” (p. 537). A
new and improved experimental design would be required to determine
whether our proposal holds merit, though, and we will provide a design
suggestion in Section 2.4.
In a study designed to determine whether immersive HMD interfaces
perform better in memory tasks than desktop computer monitors, Eric
Krokos, Catherine Plaisant and Amitabh Varshney (2019) take an embodied
and embedded approach to the virtual memory palace. Unsurprisingly,
they found that the increased immersion of an HMD allows for better
memory recall than a traditional desktop monitor. Of even more interest
are the peripheral observations they made regarding the manner of in-
teraction between participants and virtual environment. About a third of
the participants “mentioned that they actively used the virtual memory
palace setup by associating the information relative to their own body”
(p. 10). The authors further remark on the previously discussed tension
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between active and passive movement through an environment. They
refer to Barbara Brooks (1999), who found that active movement allows
for more accurate familiarisation with an environment when compared
to passive movement. However, as the same study also concluded that
the manner of movement, namely whether it was active or passive, had
no inuence on the recall of items or their positions in the environment,
Krokos, Plaisant and Varshney suggest that “memory was only enhanced
for those aspects of the environment that were interacted with directly –
particularly the environment which was navigated” (p. 4). It should further
be noted that Brooks’ ndings are based on a traditional desktop computer
monitor interface with mouse and keyboard, and it would be of interest
to redo his experiment with an HMD and direct, haptic interaction of the
participants.
Until now, research on the virtual memory palace has presented the
memorizer as a somewhat passive participant. We think the observations
made by Krokos, Plaisant and Varshney (2019), on the role of the body in
(virtual) environments, merit closer attention if we are to properly under-
stand the memory palace technique and develop appropriate interfaces
for it – like, for example, via haptic controllers. In line with Krokos and
colleagues, we propose to have future experiments assign free movement
to the memory palace users in VR. But we suggest departing from this
experiment in two ways. First, the images used for testing in the virtual
environment were pre-given, while masters of the memory palace emphas-
ise using personalized imagery for stronger memory evocation. Second,
the order of images in the virtual environment was signalled by symbols
(the numbers 1, 2, and so on). In Section 2.4, we present a way of using
lighting to direct the user’s attention in virtual environments, to move
away from symbolic cues.
With this review of current developments in the eld of the virtual
memory palace in place, we conclude there is currently no conclusive
answer to the question of whether a fully immersive approach, with head-
mount display and haptic controllers, can perform as well as (or even better
than) conventional memory palace techniques. This means that there is
a need for research which compares memory performance of memory
palace practitioners both using a conventional memory palace and a virtual
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one.3 It would furthermore be interesting to compare the performance
of memory palace practitioners not using a virtual memory palace with
ordinary subjects using a virtual memory palace, to establish whether VR
operationalization of the memory palace is on par with traditional usage.
Based on our interpretation of Yates (1966) in relation to our review of
current scientic approaches to the virtual memory palace, we surmise
that new research needs to take at least the following into account. First,
such an approach needs to investigate what sensory and navigational cues
can best support the memory palace. Second, the role of the body in virtual
environments needs to be more pronounced than it has been, specically
in terms of how the body is virtually reproduced and whether a haptic
interface to the architecture of the locus and the placement of images can
enhance the technique. Third, this approach has to promote the active
engagement of the memorizer in navigation, choice of loci, and choice of
image. Let us call this challenge, to integrate embodied implementations
of the memory palace in VR, the Operationalization Problem. It should
be clear by now that addressing the Operationalization Problem requires
rethinking our cognitive approach to the memory palace, in other words,
it requires addressing the Explanation Problem.
2.3 Addressing the Explanation Problem
In addressing the Explanation Problem, we consider two dierent and
competing frameworks which put the embodiment and embeddedness of
the cognizer in a larger environment centre stage: extended functionalism
and enactivism. In what follows, we connect the memory palace to broader
debates on embodied, extended cognition and evaluate the two proposals
just mentioned. Our conclusion is that the enactive approach oers more
3 Another way to look at virtual memory palaces is through the lens of augmented reality
devices. In a study performed at the MIT Media Lab, Rosello, Exposito and Maes (2016)
present the NeverMind application. NeverMind is designed to run on spectacles or ‘smart
glasses’ which can project images on existing physical locations in the eld of vision of the
user. The preliminary study found that images projected along a route with NeverMind
were better remembered than a list of words on a paper. While denitely an interesting
approach, NeverMind still depends on having an appropriate physical environment
available. Furthermore, it suers from the same passive involvement of participants as
the studies of Legge et al. (2012) and Jund et al. (2016). As such, it falls beyond the scope
of our paper.
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powerful resources to account for the eectiveness of the memory palace
than its functionalist competitor.
Our examination starts from recent suggestions made in cognitive
anthropology and philosophy of mind. Cognitive anthropologist Edwin
Hutchins (2005, p. 1564) recounts that the memory palace makes
opportunistic use of space. The spatial relations of the land-
marks do not contribute any semantic content to the problem.
But the landmarks themselves do provide memory cues, and
the sequential relations among the landmarks, that were cre-
ated by mapping a particular shape of motion onto them, is
inherited by the set of items to be remembered.
This seemingly supports the idea, outlined in Section 2.1, that smart
rearrangement of ‘concrete and related information patterns’ allows such
patterns to be more easily processed. However, understanding Hutchins
this way would skirt over a crucial dierence between his description and
the currently salient idea on the memory palace in neuroscience. Instead
of focusing on how information patterns might be picked up by the brain,
Hutchins, using terms like ‘landmark’ and ‘motion’, rightly emphasizes the
role of environmental triggers to cue memories and of bodily movement
to help in the ordering of them.
The relevance of environmental resources to thinking about the
memory palace has also been emphasised by John Sutton (2007). Using
the distinction between engrams, or biological memory, and exograms, or
external memory carriers, Sutton interprets the physical environments
the memory palace technique relies on – like the Sydney Opera House in
our example – as “prostheses” or “internalized exograms.” Such prostheses,
he adds, should be seen as “structuring supplements which construct and
maintain the biological processes which they simultaneously and deeply
transform” (p. 27).
We will now consider the contribution of such environmental re-
sources from the perspective of extended functionalism. Extended func-
tionalism aligns with current information-processing accounts that we
have discussed in the previous sections and can be traced back to Andy
Clark and David Chalmers’ (1998) classic paper on the extended mind.
In this paper, they question the traditional cognitive boundaries of skin
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and skull and argue that mind can sometimes be partly constituted by
parts of the environment. Clark and Chalmers argue their point by way of
their famous thought experiment about Inga and Otto. Inga and Otto are
both looking to visit the Museum of Modern Art while in New York. But
whereas Inga uses her biological memory to recall the museum’s address,
Otto, a suerer of early-onset Alzheimer’s, retrieves it through his note-
book. The notebook, Clark and Chalmers argue, plays the same role for
Otto that biological memory plays for Inga (p. 13). In it, Otto stores the
things he would like to remember and his daily routine depends structur-
ally, not incidentally, on his writing – similar to how Inga depends on her
biological memory. It is important to note that this constitution claim is
stronger than the trivial claim that mind is (merely) causally aected by
the environment.
Early extended mind theorists stressed the idea that physical boundar-
ies do not demarcate the mental and argue for this by way of the so-called
parity principle. The idea is that “[i]f, as we confront some task, a part of
the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would
have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then
that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process” (Clark
& Chalmers, 1998, p. 8). The parity principle encourages us to think that
restraining cognitive processes merely to, for example, the brain, would
be a case of misplaced neural chauvinism.
The parity principle is the main reason the extended mind is usually
seen as part of the larger cognitive programme of functionalism (Clark,
2008a; Wheeler, 2010b, 2015), roughly the idea that mental states are to be
dened and characterized by the job they perform. Focusing on functions,
instead of material realizers, opens up the way to think that some cognitive
processes can be implemented, at least partly, by elements outside the skull.
Therefore, theorists working on functionalism are neutral with respect
to the whereabouts of cognition, thus providing a natural home for the
extended mind thesis.
So how exactly does the memory palace relate to the extended mind
hypothesis? Sutton (2010) proposes that, even though mnemonic devices
such as the memory palace are not literal external artefacts, the structures
they provide function much like Otto’s notebook. In this way, Sutton
expands the reach of the initial extended mind hypothesis by arguing it can
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capture not only natural and biological objects, but also cultural practices.
He therefore concludes that “taking EM [Extended Mind] seriously ...
means that we treat such architectures, systems, and practices as both
cognitive and extended whether or not they happen to be outside the skin”
(p. 209).
Let us then give a tentative account of the memory palace according to
an extended functionalist framework. As said previously, mental states are,
for the functionalist, to be understood in terms of the job they perform.4
Extended functionalists cast these jobs in terms of information-processing
– recall Inga and Otto and that “the information in the notebook functions
just like the information constituting an ordinary non-occurrent belief”
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13). Biological memory is, on this framework,
understood as a process which involves the storing and retrieving of
informational content, where this content is “sitting somewhere in memory
waiting to be accessed” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 12). When an event is
experienced, some piece of information is stored to be later retrieved when
required. It has to be noted, however, that the extended functionalist would
emphasize that it “doesn’t matter whether the data are stored somewhere
inside the biological organism or stored in the external world. What matters
is how information is poised for retrieval and for immediate use as and
when required” (Clark, 2003, p. 69). In light of this framework, we could
understand the memory palace technique as a way of structuring the
contents and marking them through image-association. During retrieval,
the memorizer recollects the relevant contents while she imagines walking
through the palace. The images are encountered, the information they
encode picked up, and integrated into that which was to be remembered.
On this account of extended memory, remembered contents are conceived
of as accessible, objective commodities (see Loader, 2013, p. 167).
This type of canonical, “rst wave” (Sutton, 2010) extended cognition
thinking seems to come some way in explaining the memory palace. It
helps us to think of the memory palace as a cognitive structure which
supports the memorizer in placing images in a particular order. However,
there are two aws with the current functionalist explanation. First, though
it putatively captures the role the environment plays in the process of
encoding and retrieving information, it neglects to explain why the role
4 For a current and general functionalist account of memory, see Fernández (2018).
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of bodily movement in both learning and recall phase of the memory
palace is of importance. Second, it is unclear how, on this account, the
extra information the memory palace would presumably require being
processed during the recall phase, actually helps with remembering.
Some extended functionalists, however, have enriched their account
to accommodate the role of the body. Clark (2008a), in advocating extended
functionalism, proposes two dierent takes on the role of the body. On
the one hand, there is what he dubs the ‘Larger Mechanism Story’ (LMS),
while, on the other, we nd the ‘Special Contribution Story’ (SC). These two
stories are explanatorily competitive in that they each assign a dierent
role to the body in the context of embodied cognition.
On LMS, the body is thought to play a special role in the larger
information-processing mechanism. To illustrate, Clark (2008a) compares
the mental calculation of a sum by a human with how a snake, called
Adder, may slither across the keys of an electronic calculator in such a
way as to achieve a similar result. He concludes that in both cases the
same cognitive operation is performed. The process of the snake’s body
moving over the keys is functionally equivalent to whatever activity the
brain putatively performs to process the relevant information. Because
the calculation of the sum is dened in terms of symbol manipulation,
extended functionalists can abstract away from the specic material im-
plementations of the calculation and, as such, consider that the body of
the snake is no more special than whatever parts of the brain realize these
operations. Clark associates LMS with the general (extended) functionalist
agenda.
The story is, unsurprisingly, dierent for SC. On SC, as advocated by
Lawrence Shapiro (2004, 2019), the role of the body is not that of one in-
formational piece of the puzzle among many. Instead, as the name implies,
those who adhere to SC advocate that at least some of the contributions
the body makes are not reducible to mere informational processes. The
implication is that some of an organism’s cognitive processes are shaped
by the specic features of its body in a way that does not lend itself to an ex-
planation in terms of information-processing. Shapiro species that there
are at least two ways in which the body may inuence cognition: “rst, it
might generate associations that determine certain cognitive proclivities;
second, the body might, via activation of motor plans, facilitate or inhibit
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various cognitive processes” (p. 12). Thus, on SC, for the understanding of
at least some cognitive processes the consideration of the role of the body
is required.
To justify the body’s role in shaping cognition, Shapiro (2019) draws
on empirical sources. Illustrating the rst path of the body’s inuence,
he cites research which shows that right-handers prefer to interact with
objects on their right side, and left-handers on their left. The idea is that the
increased ease with which people interact with objects on their dominant
side informs their concept of “good” or “preferred” (Casasanto, 2009, 2014).
How would that human preference for one’s dominant hand be translated
to LMS with a functional description such that a handless organism would
exhibit similar cognitive dispositions? Or, as Shapiro (2019) puts it, should
“we expect Adder to prefer objects to its right or its left given that it has
no hands?” (p. 11).
Empirical evidence supports the notion that at least certain acts of
memorizing depend on a special contribution from the body, and we can
divide those into the two pathways distinguished by Shapiro. In terms of
the rst way, that of association, research in psychology has uncovered
the relevance of the context-dependence of memory (Smith & Vela, 2001).
One foundational study in this regard showed that divers who memorized
material while under water better recalled those materials while being
under water, while material learned on dry land was better recalled on land
(Godden & Baddeley, 1975; Sutton & Williamson, 2014). In terms of the
second way, we can draw on the idea that the activation of motor plans are
relevant in acts of memorizing, particularly those acts of memory which
involve the unfolding of a sequence. I might, for example, try to remember
my PIN code by, physically or imaginatively, moving my ngers in its
familiar pattern, or recall the order of the alphabet by mouthing parts of it.
Scientic research supports this idea, showing that a specic starting point
and reenactment through bodily movements is involved in the recollection
of interconnected sequences both in musical parts (Ginsborg & Sloboda,
2007; Leman & Maes, 2014; Chan, Demos & Logan, 2016) and dance
phrases (Kirsh, 2013; Stevens, Malloch, McKechnie & Steven, 2003). On
this account, humming a tune or moving one’s foot involves the triggering
of the next instance in a sequence, domino-style, by the instantiation of
its predecessor.
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Contextual relevance and the unfolding of familiar patterns are both
distinctive aspects of the memory palace technique. Yates (1966, p. 4)
stresses that the strength with which a memory is triggered depends on
carefully crafted and intense images. Furthermore, the whole environment
of a memory palace may contribute to the act of associative recall, as with
the divers underwater. Similarly, the sequence with which the images
are encountered at the dierent loci and, as mentioned previously, the
neuroscientic evidence of brain areas normally associated with navigation
activating during the technique together point towards the idea that motor
plans unfold oine during the recall phase (see Section 2.1). Such relations
between the role of the body and the memory palace do not conceive of
“the body as playing an information-processing role in cognition” (Shapiro,
2019, p. 9) and so the LMS, as cast in its familiar functionalist garb, is
unable to adequately capture the memory palace.
For these reasons, we propose to look at an enactivist theory of mind
and memory that is, we argue, better able to explain the special contribution
of the body in acts of remembering. Enactivism understands cognition not
in terms of the processing of information, but in terms of the participation
of an organism in sensorimotor loops of active engagement within the
context of a larger environment (Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007).
Evan Thompson (2007), one of enactivism’s main architects, suggests that
remembering is better understood, not as the retrieval of a mental image,
but as the reproduction of a person’s past experience and that it “could
involve emulating earlier sensory experiences and thus reenacting them
in a modied way” (p. 291).
Enactivists of a radical stripe have further developed this line of
thought, casting remembering as a dynamical, re-creative act. Radical
enactivists argue that basic forms of cognition do not involve mental
representations (Hutto & Myin, 2013, 2017). In line with this research
programme, Daniel Hutto and Anco Peeters (2018) put forward the idea
that procedural memory “can be understood as the capacity to reenact
embodied procedures – often prompted and supported by patterns of
response that are triggered by external phenomena” (p. 105). Rather than
depending on the metaphor of memory as the storage and encoding of
information, a radically enactivist take on procedural memory “would
focus not on access to the contents of a store but on remembering as a
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type of action” (Loader, 2013, p. 168). Familiar patterns of response are
initiated by internal or external triggers. For example, the remembering
of how to prepare a specic meal is triggered by the ingredients and
tools which are available to the cook. These familiar patterns involve the
activation of trained neural congurations, which, according to context and
circumstance, enable specic acts (see Anderson, 2014, 2015). Following a
recipe in order to prepare a meal is, on this account, not the retrieval of
the stored information on that recipe, but the re-enactment of the dierent
steps required to make dinner according to external signposts (the onion
is glazed) which direct the individual to follow a specic familiar path
(lower the re).
Procedural memory is in current debates commonly characterized as
not relying on information-processing (Michaelian, Debus & Perrin, 2018),
but enactivism is not limited to accounts of procedural memory per se.
Recently, a number of scholars have proposed that episodic memory cent-
rally involves the construction and consideration of possible past episodes
through simulative imagining (Gerrans & Kennett, 2010; De Brigard, 2014;
Michaelian, 2016). Such proposals assume that episodic acts of remember-
ing, because of their simulative nature, necessarily involve representational
content. Memory theorist Kourken Michaelian (2016), who agrees that
understanding procedural memory need not depend on positing represent-
ational content, claims, by contrast, that appealing to contents in the case
of episodic memory is essential. The reason is that episodic memory is de-
clarative: it is available to consciousness and aects behaviour (pp. 27–28).
However, why not allow that episodic memories, like the remembering
of a conversation last week, is an act of, perhaps imperfect, simulative
reconstruction through which a proposition with the content of that con-
versation is formed and available to consciousness? That this is indicative
of current thinking about memory is shown by Michaelian, who recently
argued that radically enactive remembering aligns well with an emerging
tendency in discussions of philosophical of memory which cast remem-
bering as non-contentful (Michaelian & Sant’Anna, 2019). In following
Hutto and Peeters (2018a), we see no need to assume that all acts of re-
membering through simulative re-enactment depend on the manipulation
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of informational content. We maintain that acts of memory, such as using
the memory palace, can be explained in a non-representational way.5
Applying an enactive account of memory to the memory palace then
leads us to the following theory. In the remembering phase, the memorizer
would either walk or imagine walking through an appropriate environ-
ment, such as the Sydney Opera House, with which she has become intim-
ately familiar through active, bodily exploration. The order of the loci in
the environment ensures that they are sequentially triggered during the
recall phase, but it is up to the memorizer to ensure that the loci are then
associated with the images to be remembered. During the recall phase,
the memorizer will use her imagination to sequentially reconstruct the
environment through the familiar triggers. For example, in the case of
the Sydney Opera House, she would not remember the Opera House as
a whole. Instead, she would reconstruct the relevant features while she
images walking through it, letting the triggers guide her. Because of the
learned association with the images, these images will spring to mind
and can then be used by the memorizer to reconstruct whatever it is she
would like to remember. The previously discussed ndings by Dresler et al.
(2017), on the structural rearrangement of neural networks for users of the
memory palace, can then be reinterpreted as the construction of a network
which enables the triggering sequence – in essence, a well-practised user
of the memory palace carries the triggers of its loci with her. The user of
the memory palace is, on the enactive account, not picking up information
5 One might rightly ask how reconstructive or simulative processes of enactive remember-
ing unfold if they are not based on information storage. While this is an important issue
that deserves further elaboration, it is also an open question that needs to be addressed by
enactive approaches to memory in general. A proper discussion of this unfortunately falls
outside the scope of the current paper. As a tentative proposal, we suggest that enactive
remembering involving the previously mentioned processes depend on the sensorimotor
activation of familiar patterns. To illustrate, we refer to how articial neural networks
can be trained to generate images (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Such networks do not store
specic pixels, but depend on adjusting the signalling strength between nodes during
training. After training they may then activate areas on a pre-given (digital) canvas
and thus generate an image. Similarly, a person, with an adult, developed brain, may be
triggered to think about the Sydney Opera House because of a word read or a sound
heard. This trigger may generate, through many intermediary steps, partial images of
white, rounded domes against the background of water. It may even be that this person
will use her consciousness to help herself generating the memory, for instance, by asking
herself “Are the distinctive white shells of the Sydney Opera House spread across two
or three separate parts of the building?” Naturally, this is a gross simplication, but it
serves as an initial step towards developing a robust enactive account of remembering.
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but reconstructing something resembling that which she was supposed to
originally remember.
Though enactive remembering seems well suited to explain the role
of embodiment in the memory palace while those bodily engagements
are not straightforwardly intelligible in information-processing terms,
extended functionalists may counter with an adjustment to their theory. In
a striking experiment, Wendy Mackay and colleagues (1998) investigated
the adaptation of new electronic air-strips at an airtrac station. In the late
1990s, traditional paper-made strips contained information about speed
and direction of incoming airplanes and were used as an integral tool in
the safe control of air trac around Paris. Researchers were tasked to
investigate how the use of such strips could be improved or even replaced
with electronic devices. Initial trials with replacing the paper-based system
with a computer-based one met with resistance by the trac controllers.
Advocating extended functionalism, Michael Wheeler (2010b) observes
that, from the perspective of an engineer, “one is inclined to focus, naturally
enough, on the information carried by these strips. But this is not the only
contribution of the strips.” (p. 33). It turns out that the strips were used
in ways beyond merely carrying information. For example, they may be
held in the hand as a reminder, placed at an angle to indicate two planes
on a potential collision course, or, supported by the use of a strip-holding
board, aord the signaling of important ight movements through body
language. Wheeler’s analysis is worth quoting in full:
From a practical perspective, this recognition of the non-
informational contribution of the ight strips is far from idle.
The testimonial evidence suggests that a number of previous
attempts to introduce new computer technology into air-trac
control may ultimately have been rejected as unworkable
by the controllers precisely because the proposed replacement
systems attempted to reproduce the straightforwardly informa-
tional aspects of the ight strips while ignoring the extra factors.
(Wheeler, 2010b, p. 33, emphasis added.)
Wheeler concludes that “nothing about this story undermines the
extended functionalist line” (p. 33). This implies that the extended function-
alist’s story either needs elaboration on the dierences between ‘straight-
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foward informational aspects’ (like the writing on the strips) and material
informational factors (like the orientation of the strips), or that it need not
be an information-processing story exclusively. Extended functionalism,
as advanced by Wheeler, can thus allow for the materiality of artefacts,
such as ight strips, to implement cognitive states as well, because it is
neutral with respect to what cognitive states are made of.
Allowing extended functionalism to go beyond merely information-
processing by recognizing the material roles artefacts play, looks like a
promising move to give a functionalist account of the memory palace.
As Wheeler admits, though, his proposal needs further analysis. We see
two paths which the extended functionalist could take. The rst one is
to develop an account which explains the interplay between the informa-
tional processing of memories and the role the body plays when walking,
imaginatively or not, through the memory palace. Recall that cognitive
scientists currently explain the memory palace technique as somehow
transforming abstract information units into concrete information pat-
terns. The functionalist needs to provide an explanation of these types
of information, explaining whether or not these are dierent kinds of
information, and how transformations between the two take shape. While
perhaps not logically impossible, this path seems to lead to conceptually
murky waters (Hutto & Myin, 2013, Ch. 4).
A second path for the extended functionalist is to get rid of informa-
tional talk altogether and lean on an embodied approach to the memory
palace which is entirely non-representationalist. This might seem like a
radical move to some philosophers, but it looks like Wheeler is opening
the door to that possibility. And a brief look at the history of functionalism
provides ground for supporting this move. As Gualtiero Piccinini (2010)
argues, functionalism in its purest form is merely the metaphysical claim
that cognitive processes are to be understood as structural organizations
with input and output relations (see also Putnam, 1967).6 It seems that
an extended functionalist account of the memory palace based on bodily
engagement and not on information processing, is a possibility.
6 Not all functionalists might agree with the claim that pure functionalism is merely a
metaphysical claim. However, my aim here is not to present some kind of essential feature
of functionalism, but to trace the genealogy of the extended functionalist line back to its
most general shape, like Piccinini (2010) does.
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Yet, if functionalists surrender their commitment to the information-
processing framework, then what dierence is left between extended
functionalist and enactivist approaches when it comes to explaining the
memory palace? It seems the functionalist’s metaphysical account would,
to the extent to which they could explain techniques such as the memory
palace in terms of bodily engagement, collapse into their competitor theor-
ies on enactivism (see Hutto, Peeters & Segundo-Ortin, 2017). Elucidating
the implications of this collapse lies beyond our current argument, but we
would be interested to hear what an adapted extended functionalist story
would oer that our enactivist story does not.
The extended functionalist, then, has two options. Either develop
an information processing account that is not only able to explain how
the body plays its role in the memory palace, but also the transformation
of abstract into concrete information (whatever that may be). Or, she
could surrender her commitment to information-processing altogether and
adopt a fully embodied and non-representational account of the memory
palace which basically collapses into an enactive account. In any case, the
functionalist is currently not in a position to explain the memory palace
while the enactivist is not trapped in a similar dilemma. We conclude
that thinking about the memory palace from an enactivist perspective is
therefore the better option.
We submit that a radically enactive account of memory, which de-
pends on cues and triggers for re-enactment, may act as a clarifying lens
through which to look at mnemonic techniques that centrally involve
interaction between a person and their environment, such as the memory
palace, whether virtual, imagined or otherwise. As we have seen in the
previous section, cognitive scientists currently explain the memory palace
in terms of information encoding and retrieval, which leads to virtual
memory palaces in which the memorizer is a passive participant with only
a supercially strong connection to the used locus. Such operationaliza-
tions are better served by an enactivist approach which explains why a
multimodal memorization technique that heavily involves visualisation,
active involvement of a body with an environment, and the reconstruction
of memories is more ecient than learning words from a list. The latter
mnemonic after all, provides less triggers and cues with which to rebuild
memorized items, while the former builds upon such resources and abilit-
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ies for reconstruction which are already in place. Our next step, then, is to
determine which resources and abilities a virtual memory palace needs to
work on.
2.4 Addressing the Operationalization Problem
How can VR technologies support the practice of the memory palace
technique? We propose that VR can support the practice of the memory
palace in at least two ways. First, by supporting the user with a virtual
memory palace inspired by recent discussions in cognitive science, thus
both relieving the user of the need to go to a familiar, physical building
to practise and making sure that the virtual environment evokes those
sensorimotor interactions which resemble traditional memory palace us-
age. Second, by enhancing the memory palace technique by actually going
beyond that which is feasible through traditional methods, for example by
sharing virtual memory palaces with other users or by supplying the user
with visual cues to improve memorisation. These two notions form the
inspiration for the following operationalization proposal.
As said earlier, deciding on how best to support the memory palace
technique in VR depends on one’s answer to the Explanation Problem. In
contrast to existing operationalizations of the memory palace we argue
for an enactive and re-creative account of remembering. If this argument
strikes true, it has implications for the operationalization of the memory
palace in VR. Specically, it means that such operationalizations need
to be rethought through the perspective of an embodied cognizer which
takes the movement within and active engagement with her (virtual) en-
vironment seriously and moves away from the idea that using the memory
palace is merely a way of reordering and picking up information. In what
follows, we propose that adopting an enactive take on memory will sup-
port the practice of the virtual memory palace and that it may help to solve
the Operationalization Problem of current designs. We do so by giving
concrete design recommendations based on this enactive approach.
To move away from the information processing model of the virtual
memory palace, the role of the memorizer needs to be recast from passive
observer to active participant. In order to do so, we will single out two
aspects of current memory palace operationalizations and translate them
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into active, body-engaging modes of interaction: movement of the user,
and the creation and placement of images. As discussed in the previous
section, this translation has to keep in mind the unfolding of sequences
through the activation of motor plans in acts of memory. This requires
active participation of the body.
Regarding the rst aspect, instead of the user being moved through a
virtual space passively, we propose that any VR operationalization of the
memory palace ought to depart from the idea that the user is actively mov-
ing herself through an environment – say a virtual apartment or cathedral.
This is not only in line with Yates’ (1966) account, which posits the indi-
vidual moving through the space and engaging with sensori-navigational
cues as an essential part of the technique, but also with the two main
insights gleaned from current memory research as discussed in Section 2.1.
The rst is that, at least in some situations, the activation of motor plans
supports remembering – recall the examples on PIN codes, music, and
dance from the previous section. We have argued that the memory palace
is of a similar kind to those examples and thus involves motor activation.
Second, neuroscientic evidence supports the idea that brain areas associ-
ated with spatial navigation are involved in the use of the memory palace.
As such, we think approaches where users are either passively moved or
there is no movement at all, do not support the optimal unfolding of a
memory sequence.
Moving on to the second point, the placement of images, we present a
similar line of reasoning. Active participation of the body in the placement
of images in a virtual space would mean that the user should be able to
do two things. First, she should be able to either choose or, preferably,
create personalised images which may represent parts of that which she
wants to memorize. A database in the virtual space, where images can
be stored and retrieved, can support the user friendliness and re-use and
easy adjustment of images. Second, the user should then be able to place
those images in distinct locations in the virtual memory palace. Virtual
reality devices with hand-held controllers that can mimic regular hand
movements seem especially suited for these use-cases.
Now that we have discussed how the memory palace technique could
be translated to VR, by using insights from an enactive approach to cogni-
tion to improve movement and image placement, we will present ways
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Figure 2.1: Imaginary virtual memory palace with a suggested locus
highlighted.
of potentially enhancing the virtual memory palace. Is it possible to go
beyond the technique’s traditional limitations? And if so, how?
One way in which to take advantage of computer technology is to
highlight features of the virtual environment in such a way as to support
the user’s needs. In this, we take inspiration from work done by Vicente
Raja and Paco Calvo (2017), who propose a way of looking at augmented
reality based on ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979). In discussing navig-
ational apps, such as Google Maps, they argue that instead of overloading
a user by presenting yet more symbolic information on a screen, for ex-
ample, by showing a top down map with arrows and numbers, certain
pathways might be emphasised more subtly. For instance, one can imagine
a user wearing smart glasses which brighten those areas that the user
should go, and darken areas the user should avoid. This nudges a user into
the destination she wants to go to. Similarly, we suggest, parts of one’s
virtual memory palace can be highlighted during the learning phase if they
oer a memorable location to carry an image associated with part of what
one wants to remember (see Figure 2.1). Or, also during learning, when
unfolding the sequence of the memory the next part of the sequence in the
virtual space that a user needs to go to can be brightened, visually, as the
64 CHAPTER 2. MISPLACING MEMORIES IN VIRTUAL REALITY
Figure 2.2: The walls in these consecutive images expand in a process
of optic expansion.
next space to move to. So instead of overloading the user with symbolic
information, a virtual environment might support memory performance
by highlighting the relevant aordances this environment oers to the
user (Storegen, Bardy & Mantel, 2006).
A second way of enhancing the virtual memory palace concerns
what we dub ‘sensorimotor realism.’ Note that realism here should not
be understood in its common, digitalized meaning: as the photo-realistic
replication of images and textures. Contrary to this, perhaps intuitive,
idea, there is empirical evidence which suggests that familiar sensorimotor
interaction in virtual environments contributes more to the immersion
of the memorizer in her memory palace than high-resolution imagery
(Fink, Foo & Warren, 2009). Sensorimotor interaction in VR further seems
to improve one’s sense of agency, in the sense of experiencing control
over one’s actions and their consequences (Kong, He & Wei, 2017), which
ties in nicely with and supports the previously discussed active bodily
participation.
By sensorimotor realism we mean that a VR device involving move-
ment needs to replicate the kind of sensory patterns we experience when
we move in real life. To illustrate, think of what occurs when you approach
a wall. As you approach the wall, you see how the texture gradients of
the wall radiate from the centre of your visual eld, causing the wall to
expand from the perspective of the perceiver (see Figure 2.2). This is com-
monly described by saying that optic ow is centrifugal in the direction of
locomotion (Chemero, 2009, p. 124). The rate at which optic ow expands
is lawfully correlated to the speed to which we move towards the object –
the wall in this case. By saying that a virtual environment must be sensor-
imotor realistic we mean that it must echo the sensorimotor experience
we are used to in real life. The optic ow generated while moving towards
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an object in the virtual environment ought to be the same as the one
we get when we do so in real life. Otherwise, our experience of moving
through the virtual space will feel odd and unpleasant (Bubka, Bonato &
Palmisano, 2008), and it will require us to take extra eort to get attuned
to the sensorimotor contingencies of the virtual environment. Ensuring
sensorimotor realism will thus add to the immersiveness of the virtual
memory palace.
Incorporating active bodily participation lies at the heart of our pro-
posal for operationalizing the virtual memory palace. For the translation
of the memory palace to VR, we argued that this requires the user to take
control in the virtual environment. For potentially enhancing the virtual
memory palace, we proposed to make use of sensorimotor guidance that
makes optimal use of the type of interactions the user is already familiar
with.
2.5 New horizons for memory research
Considering the memory palace from an embodied, enactive perspective,
in line with the pragmatic turn in cognitive science, helps in understanding
why current operationalizations of the technique in VR leave much to be
desired. Such operationalizations focus on supporting the picking up of
information by the user, but we have argued that this does not capture
what is at the core of the technique.
Instead, we presented design recommendations for improving the
virtual memory palace, focusing on embodied cognition and aordances.
Smart use of VR devices could make the learning of the memory palace
more accessible and increase the usage of one of the most powerful meth-
ods of remembering on oer. Our design recommendations are ready for
implementation. If their adaptation yields better results than current opera-
tionalizations, this will have both practical and philosophical implications.
To start with the latter: if virtual memory palaces based on our enactive
proposal work well outside of the head, it would provide a good reason,
by way of abduction, to re-evaluate what is going inside the head. By way
of a reversed parity principle, the enactivist research programme would
have provided an impressive case in point in terms of understanding the
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underpinnings of memory, placing the ball squarely in the functionalist
park.
The practical implications, if our proposal holds true, lie in making
the power of the memory palace more accessible and their advantages are
obvious. Special attention should be given to its potential use in educa-
tional settings (Putnam, 2015). We predict that using VR devices to support
learning through the memory palace can greatly enhance learning ex-
periences (in line with: Mäkelä & Löytönen, 2017; Heersmink, 2018). Not
only that, but activities which are traditionally seen as boring, like the
rote learning of words from a foreign language, would potentially become
a lot more fun because of the engaged, bodily interaction. Furthermore,
in classroom settings, both teachers and students can benet from the
shared experience which VR will allow. Unlike in the traditional technique,
teachers would be able to participate in and give feedback on how their
students utilize the memory palace.
Our proposal, though grounded on available empirical data, requires
more experimentation. Not only to test whether the hypothesized design
recommendations will improve the use of the memory palace, but also to
investigate aspects of the techniques that were hereto hard or impossible
to investigate. The sharing of the same loci, as described in the previous
paragraph is one aspect, but this could be generalized to the investigation
of loci which are not necessarily environmental landmarks as traditionally
imagined. For example, how will moving objects like animals or other
persons aect the technique? What about videos? Virtual realities allow
for plenty of creative freedom and the memory palace is a worthy candidate
for testing the limits of that freedom with respect to successful memory
strategies.
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Abstract
We propose that virtue ethics can be used to address ethical issues central to dis-
cussions about sex robots. In particular, we argue virtue ethics is well equipped to
focus on the implications of sex robots for human moral character. Our evaluation
develops in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics as a suitable framework for
the evaluation of human–robot relationships. Second, we show the advantages of
our virtue ethical account of sex robots by comparing it to current instrumentalist
approaches, showing how the former better captures the reciprocal interaction
between robots and their users. Third, we examine how a virtue ethical analysis
of intimate human–robot relationships could inspire the design of robots that
support the cultivation of virtues. We suggest that a sex robot which is equipped
with a consent-module could support the cultivation of compassion when used
in supervised, therapeutic scenarios. Fourth, we discuss the ethical implications
of our analysis for user autonomy and responsibility.
This chapter is published, in a slightly modied form, as: Peeters, A. & Haselager,
P. (2019). Designing virtuous sex robots. International Journal of Social Robotics,
1–12. Online rst publication. Anco Peeters is the main author of this chapter,
having authored the rst three sections, introduction, and conclusion, and taking
the lead on structuring the argument. Pim Haselager wrote a draft of the fourth
section and Anco Peeters then contributed to it. Both authors contributed to
polishing the text. Pim Haselager permits the inclusion of the chapter in the
present thesis. Footnote 3 was added to link to scientic developments presented
after the publication of the current chapter.
Pim Haselager
November 2, 2019
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Chapter 3
Designing virtuous sex robots
“We need an ethics that does not stare obsessively at the issue
of whether a given technology is morally acceptable but that
looks at the quality of life that is lived with technology.”
Peter-Paul Verbeek (2011, p. 156)
Some may nd it hard to come to grips with sex robots. Yet recent events,
like the 2015 Campaign Against Sex Robots in the UK, the 2017 publication
of John Danaher and Neil McArthur’s volume on the ethical and societal
implications of robot sex, and the fourth incarnation of the International
Conference on Love and Sex with Robots, show that this topic has captured
the public’s eye and provokes serious academic debate. A recent report by
the Foundation for Responsible Robotics (Sharkey, van Wynsberghe, Rob-
bins & Hancock, 2017) calls for a broad and informed societal discussion
on intimate robotics, because manufacturers are taking initial steps to-
wards building sex robots. We take up this call by applying virtue ethics
to analyse intimate human–robot relationships.
Why should we look at such relationships through the lens of virtue
ethics? Virtue ethics is one of the three main ethical theories on oer
and distinguishes itself by putting human moral character centre stage
– as opposed to the intentions or consequences of actions. Virtue ethics
has been discussed in relation to articial intelligence more generally
(Wallach & Allen, 2009; Tonkens, 2012). However, virtue ethics has received
relatively little attention in discussions regarding sex with robots, even
though sex robots could have a signicant impact on their user’s moral
character. Two main exceptions are Litska Strikwerda (2017), who assesses
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arguments against the use of child sex robots, and Robert Sparrow (2017),
who suggests that rape representation by robots could encourage the
cultivation of vices. Our aims are dierent, as we will not focus on either
child sex robots or robots that play into rape fantasies. Instead, we propose
how virtue ethics can be used to contribute to the potential positive aspects
of intimate human–robot interactions through the cultivation of virtues,
and provide suggestions for the design process of such robots.
We develop our thesis in four steps. First, we present virtue ethics
in relation to other ethical theories and argue that, because of its focus
on the situatedness of human moral character, virtue ethics is in a better
position to assess aspects of intimate human-robot interaction (see also
Vallor, 2016, p. 209). Second, we show how our virtue ethical account fares
better than current instrumentalist approaches to sex robots, such as those
inspired by the seminal and pioneering work of David D. Levy (2007a,
2007b). Such instrumentalist approaches focus too much on the usability
aspects of the interaction and, unjustly, frame sex robots as neutral tools.
Understanding the interaction with a sex robot as mere consumption in-
suciently acknowledges the risk of their inuence on how humans think
about and act on love and sex. Third, we propose a way to reduce the risks
identied by considering how the cultivation of compassion as a virtue
may help in practising consent-scenarios in therapeutic settings. This way,
we aim to show how, under certain conditions, love and sex with robots
might actually help to enhance human behaviour. Fourth, we examine the
implications our virtue ethical analysis on intimate human–robot relations
may have on our understanding of autonomy and responsibility.
3.1 Virtue ethics and social robotics
Current ethical debates on human–robot interaction are generally not
framed in terms of virtues, but in terms of action outcomes or rules to
be followed. It strikes us as regrettable that up until now, virtue ethics
has received relatively little attention in the literature on social robotics
in general, and on intimate human-robot relations in particular (but see
Abney, 2012; Gips, 1995). A virtue-ethical analysis can help evaluate how,
on the one hand, human agents could make use of love and sex robots in
ways that may be judged to be (un)problematic. On the other hand, virtue
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ethics may help to clarify how human behaviour and societal views are
inuenced by the use of such robots and thereby help us to learn more
about what it is to be a virtuous person in an intimate relationship. To
establish the potential of virtue ethics for the evaluation of intimate human–
robot relationships, we will examine aspects of virtue ethics relevant to
the current discussion and consider what it has to add compared to other
ethical approaches.
Virtue ethics departs from the idea that the cultivation of human
character is fundamental to questions of morality. In the Western philo-
sophical tradition, Aristotle’s theory of virtue ethics is the most inuential
and he denes virtue as an excellent trait of character.1 Such traits, like
honesty, courage and compassion, are stable dispositions to reliably act
in the right way according to the situation one is in. Aristotle describes
a virtue as, in general, the right mean between two extremes (vices). He
states that courage, for example, can be described as the mean between
recklessness and cowardice (Nicomachean Ethics, II.1104a7). Finding the
right middle between extremes is a challenging task and approaching
that middle often requires extensive practice. In addition to practice, ac-
quiring a virtue is helped by instruction from an exemplary teacher. A
virtuous person will have cultivated her character to be disposed to natur-
ally act in the right way in the relevant situation. It should be noted that
although virtues are not about singular acts, acting honestly, courageously
or compassionately may help a person to become honest, courageous or
compassionate. This potential interactive loop, of internalising behaviour
by practice and feedback, motivates our interest in applying virtue ethics
to intimate human-robot interaction.
Consequentialism and deontology are the two main rival theories
to virtue ethics, and they dominate current discussions on the ethics of
social robotics. Consequentialism is the ethical doctrine that takes the
outcome of an action as fundamental to normative questions. Deontology
or duty-based ethics takes the principles motivating an action as central
to matters of morality. Operationalization of these frameworks can take
dierent forms. For example, in the case of consequentialism, articial
1 Other inuential virtue ethical traditions originated with, for example, Confucius or
Buddhism. For reasons of space, we shall restrict ourselves to a (neo-)Aristotelian account
of virtue, but we suspect that the investigation of other virtue traditions could yield an
interesting intercultural approach to the ethics of social robotics. See also Vallor (2016).
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agents could be programmed to evaluate the potential costs and benets
of an action (Deng, 2015; Wineld, Blum & Liu, 2014; Sharkey, 2008; Flor-
idi & Sanders, 2004). Or, in the case of deontology, designers may strive
to implement top-level moral rules in agents (Danielson, 1992).2 As con-
sequentialism and deontology provide frameworks that can be translated
relatively straightforward into implementation guidelines, they may be
attractive from a roboticist’s perspective. While we value the contributions
of consequentialist and deontological approaches to the literature on robot
ethics, we think that there are ethical issues which virtue ethics is in a bet-
ter position to address. Such issues include how, in the words of Shannon
Vallor (2016), advances in social robots are “shaping human habits, skills,
and traits of character for the better, or for worse” (p. 211). Importantly,
this insight supports the idea that robots are not neutral instruments, but
that they may inuence the way we think and act. We side, therefore,
with other researchers who recognize that virtue ethics can be a fruitful
framework for AI and robotics (Abney, 2012, p. 37).
There are at least three ways in which virtues (and vices) might
play a role in social robotics. First, we may consider which virtues are or
ought to be involved on the human side of robot design. For instance, is it
desirable that a roboticist exhibits unbiasedness and inclusiveness when
designing a robot? Second, robots may nudge users towards virtuous (or
vicious) behaviour. An exercise robot, for example, can encourage proper
exercise and discipline by giving positive feedback to its user. Third, robots
may exhibit virtues (and vices) through their own behaviour. This can be
illustrated by the Sociable Trash Box robot developed at Michio Okada’s lab
at Toyohashi University of Technology (Yamaji, Miyake, Yoshiike, De Silva
& Okada, 2011): these robots exhibit helpfulness and politeness through
their vocalisations and bowing behaviour when they collaborate with
humans to dispose of trash (see Figure 3.1). So one could focus on the
virtues of the designer, on the way robot behaviour aects the virtues of
a human interacting with it, or on the virtues displayed by the robot, for
instance, as an example to be followed or learned from. We will focus on the
latter two points, but towards the end discuss their implications for design.
2 Isaac Asimov’s famous laws of robotics, often cited as illustration in the ethics of AI
literature, are modelled after deontological formulations of how one ought to act. They
brilliantly showcase the inherent tension between deontological robotic directives and
the potentially disastrous consequences that strict adherence to these might have.
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Figure 3.1: The Sociable Trash Box exhibits helpfulness and politeness
when it requests trash and then bows after receiving it. Reprinted by
permission from Springer Nature: Springer International Journal of Social
Robotics (Yamaji, Miyake, Yoshiike, De Silva & Okada, 2011), © 2019.
We think it is likely that the degree of anthropomorphism (Sparrow, 2002,
2016; Cappuccio, Peeters & MacDonald, 2019; Björling, Rose, Davidson,
Ren & Wong, 2019) will play an important role for especially the second and
third topics. This needs to be further investigated, but for the purposes of
this chapter we will discuss robots that tend towards the anthropomorphic
rather than the more functional end – like conventional sex toys – of the
anthropomorphism spectrum.
In relation to the third aspect, some have said that virtues might be
dicult, or even intractable, to implement in a robot. This idea is motivated
by the complexity of giving general, context-independent denitions of
specic virtues and because an implementation of a virtue like honesty “re-
quires an algorithm for determining whether any given action is honestly
performed” (Allen, Varner & Zinser, 2000, p. 258). Although we acknow-
ledge the specic implementation challenges that virtue ethics brings,
we think these challenges can be addressed by looking at the underlying
mistaken assumption that virtues need to be implemented top-down into
the robot. Analogous to how humans learn to be virtuous not by being
told what to do but by example, implementing virtues into the design of
social robots can take a similar situational approach. For this reason, it
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has been argued that the “virtue-based approach to ethics, especially that
of Aristotle, seems to resonate well with the [...] connectionist approach
to AI. Both seem to emphasize the immediate, the perceptual, the non-
symbolic. Both emphasize development by training rather than by the
teaching of abstract theory” (Gips, 1995, p. 249). This resemblance, we
suggest, can help inspire the implementation of virtues in modern-day
robots. The use of machine learning with articial neural networks may be
a way of avoiding the need to write an algorithm that species what action
needs to be taken when. Virtues that depend on, for example, recognizing
emotions in a human and require an emotional response can be imple-
mented by training a neural network on selected input – say, by analysing
videos of previously screened empathic responses made by humans (as
done by Janssen et al., 2013; Güçlütürk et al., 2017). Through machine
learning, robots could similarly learn to mimic certain behaviours that we
might consider displays of virtue, such as a light touch on the shoulder
to express sympathy.3 The challenging research question here would be
how to operationalize this kind of training so that the robot learns from
human teachers. Such implementations are not trivial, but they need not
be intractable either.
Two potential points of critique need to be addressed before moving
on. The rst critique has been voiced by robot ethicist Robert Sparrow
(2017), who argues that sex robots could encourage vicious behaviour,
while at the same time maintaining that he nds it hard to imagine sex
robots could promote virtue. He proposes that if people own sex robots,
they can live out whatever fantasies they have on the robots – even rape.
He argues that repeated fantasizing and repeated exercise of potential
representations of rape will inuence one’s character to become more
vicious. Though we agree with Sparrow’s premise that this development
is problematic and deserves careful consideration, we disagree with the
conclusion drawn. While rape representation might be facilitated by sex
robots, this does not mean that the production of such robots need always
be ethically inimical. Let us assume that rape-play between two consenting
3 After the publication of the present chapter, research by Senft, Lemaignan, Baxter, Bartlett
and Belpaeme (2019) has shown how it is possible to teach robots human-like social beha-
viour through mimicry and machine learning, with the authors specically mentioning
application of their research in therapeutic scenarios.
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adults is not necessarily morally wrong.4 What is potentially morally
wrong in acting out this scenario, is that it might normalize the associated
repeated behaviour outside of a consensual context – the cultivation of a
vice. This could lead to unwanted degrading behaviour or generalization
to other contexts involving human-human interaction. The same risk of
inappropriate generalization applies to the scenario of the human–robot
interaction. In the case of humans, this means that careful and continuous
communication about what is allowed and what is not is crucial: the
partners have to trust and respect each other in order to safely play out
the fantasy and stay aware of the fact that it is a fantasy. Might a similar
approach be possible to intimate human-robot interactions? We submit
that there are ways to involve consent in the case of intimate human-robot
interaction aimed to prevent the risk Sparrow is drawing attention to,
without condemning the manufacture and use of sex robots in principle.5
It would require us to rethink sex education and the role sex robots can
play in this, which we do in Section 3.3. Interestingly, if one accepts that
sex robots may cultivate vices in humans, it seems possible that such robots
potentially also cultivate virtues.6
A second issue that needs addressing is a more general critique against
virtue ethics. It has been argued that virtue ethics as an ethical theory
is “elitist and overly demanding and, consequently, it is claimed that the
virtuous life plausibly could prove unattainable” (Fröding, 2011, p. 223).
Why propose such a demanding ethical theory for framing human-robot
interaction? First, because virtue ethics can do justice to an assumption we
make, namely that intimate, sexual relations between humans and robots
4 It is worth noting that on Sparrow’s account one will have to bite the bullet and say that
rape-play by consenting adults is morally wrong as well. Not everyone will be willing to
accept this implication.
5 Obviously, the consent provided by a robot does not amount to legally binding consent,
just like the rape of a robot would not constitute legal rape, for the simple reason that a
robot is not a legal person and not a sentient being. Hence, we are discussing here the
implications of a robot behaving in a certain way, not necessarily implying the existence
of human-like cognitive, emotional states or identical legal status.
6 Sparrow (2017) nds it “much less plausible that sustaining kind and loving relationships
with robots can be sucient to make us virtuous” (p. 473). He acknowledges, however,
that such a claim needs to be supported by an argument as to why virtues are to be held
against a standard dierent from vices and that this is a topic for further discussion. We
do not share his intuition, though we agree with his latter point and would furthermore
like to add that more empirical data on how human–robot interaction inuences human
behaviour is needed – which is one of the motivations for the proposal in Section 3.3 of
the present chapter.
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Consequentialism Deontology Virtue ethics Instrumentalism
Fundamental
concept
Action out-
comes
Moral rule Virtue Instrumental
use
Concept
applied
Obtaining
consent
maximizes
well-being for
both parties.
Obtaining con-
sent is in ac-
cordance with
the rule: “Do
unto others as
you would be
done by.”
Obtaining con-
sent is compas-
sionate and re-
spectful.
Obtaining
consent is not
necessary, un-
less required
for obtaining
satisfaction.
Table 3.2: Suppose we compare the multiple approaches in a hypothet-
ical scenario where sexual consent is negotiated, verbal or otherwise,
between two human partners. This table aims to show how such a
scenario can be analysed in the dierent ways discussed in the present
chapter. This rough distinction should not be taken to mean that, for ex-
ample, consequentialism cannot talk about virtues. What distinguishes
the dierent approaches is which concept they take to be central.
should be understood as bi-directional. In this context, bi-directional means
that humans design robots, while the general availability of such robots in
turn may inuence human practice of and ideas on intimacy and love. In
contrast, current ways of thinking about intimate human-robot relations
often depart from an instrumental and unidirectional assumption. Such
rival accounts understand these relations as the usage of tools by humans
and see any inuence that robots may have on humans as value-neutral.
They are focused on the human perspective and therefore lose sight of
important potential ethical implications of human-robot interaction, as
we will argue in Section 3.2 and as illustrated in Table 3.2. Our assumption
is in line with current developments in cognitive science and philosophy
of technology, which suggest that the cognitive and moral dimensions of
artefact interaction need to be understood from a distributed perspective
that puts equal emphasis on agent and environment (Varela et al., 1991;
Verbeek, 2011; Coeckelbergh, 2012; Di Paolo et al., 2017).
Another and possibly even more exciting reason to engage with virtue
ethics, is that thinking about virtues in relation to robots might actually
help to make virtuous behaviour more attainable. This might be done
through the habit-reinforcing guidance of humans by robots designed to
promote virtuous behaviour: either by robots nudging human behaviour
directly or by robots exhibiting virtues themselves.
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3.2 Contra instrumentalist accounts
Recent discussions on intimate human–robot relations are often informed
by the work of David D. Levy (2007a, 2007b). Levy argues that humans
will have physically realistic, human-like sex with robots and feel deep
emotions for and even fall in love with them. Although we laud the pi-
oneering work Levy has done to open up sex and love with robots for
serious academic discussion, we argue that his framework fails to properly
account for the ethical and social implications involved.
Regarding sex, Levy suggests that, physically speaking, realistic human-
like sex with robots will be possible in the near future. Though Levy paints
a colourful history of the development of sex technologies, discussion of
this is not of prime importance for our argument and we will not examine
it further. For the present discussion, we will assume that the physical
aspects of these robots can be worked out more or less along the lines
which Levy describes. Interestingly, Levy goes so far as to say that “ro-
bot sex could become better for many people than sex with humans, as
robots surpass human sexual technique and become capable of satisfying
everyone’s sexual needs” (D. Levy, 2007a, p. 249).
Regarding emotions and love, Levy suggests that it is possible that
humans can be attracted to and even fall in love with robots. Without going
into too much unnecessary detail, his argument proceeds in four steps.
First, Levy lists what causes attraction of humans to each other. Second, he
considers how aective relationships between humans and pets develop,
and, third, how such relationships develop between humans and their
virtual pets. Fourth and nally, Levy applies his ndings to human–robot
relationships.
Through a careful examination of feelings of bonding and attraction
in humans, Levy comes to the conclusion that humans will likely develop
similar feelings of bonding and attraction for robots. A large role in this
narrative is reserved for the human tendency to anthropomorphize arte-
facts (see Breazeal, 2002; Sparrow, 2002). He submits that “each and every
one of the main factors that psychologists have found to be the major
causes for humans falling in love with humans, can almost equally apply
to humans falling in love with robots” (D. Levy, 2007a, p. 128). It seems
that there are no major hindrances for humans to, at some point in the
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future, fall in love with their robot. We can, in principle, agree, with this
conclusion and it furthermore looks like recent preliminary empirical
evidence supports it (Scheutz & Arnold, 2017).
Obstacles on the path towards the use of love and sex robots are
deemed by Levy to be of a merely practical nature. The robots described
are presented as taking care and recognizing the needs of their human
partner – in terms of the feelings of bonding and attraction he listed
earlier. On several occasions (D. Levy, 2012, 2007a, pp. 219, 233) Levy
compares sex with a robot to masturbation, and uses that comparison as
a reason why robot-sex would prevent cheating on one’s partner (p. 234)
– like in the case of soldiers on a long-term mission. Moreover, Levy
describes this perspective on sex as a kind of “consumption” (D. Levy,
2007a, p. 242). It is for this reason that we characterize accounts such as
Levy’s as ‘instrumentalist.’ Love and sex robots, on such accounts, are
merely tools to be used or products to be consumed. However, we suggest
that such an instrumentalist perspective could lead to practices that provide
cause for concern. Also, we are not convinced that a purely instrumentalist
use of sex robots would make many people “better balanced human beings”
(p. 240).
A rst concern is that framing robot-sex as consumption underestim-
ates the potential impact the acceptation of love and sex robots will have
on the way love and sex are perceived. Consider a world where your “robot
will arrive from the factory with these parameters set as you specied, but
it will always be possible to ask for more ardour, more passion, or less,
according to your mood and energy level. At some point it will not even
be necessary to ask, because your robot will, through its relationship with
you, have learned to read your moods and desires and to act accordingly”
(D. Levy, 2007a, p. 129).
Why would people, when such partners are available, be content with
any kind of relationship, emotional or sexual, that would not adhere to
this standard of perfection? Access to these robots would make it tempting
to view relationships as essentially one-directional need-catering and ef-
fortless, especially perhaps for adolescents who grow up with such access.
This is not how love and sex at present needs to be or even generally is
conceived, and it goes deeply against the conception of a relationship as
existing between two or more equal persons. Seeing humanoid robots
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capable of emotional and sexual interaction as tools is like being in a
relationship with a slave. There lies an important question at the core
of this issue, specically on whether there are ways of considering the
relationship between human and robot that are not slave-like. However,
this falls outside the scope of the current chapter (though for a beginning
of an answer to this question, see Cappuccio et al., 2019). In any case, this
comparison illustrates the extent to which Levy’s framework is unidirec-
tional, which is further exemplied by his comparison of robot-sex with
masturbation. Masturbation, at least generally speaking, is a solitary en-
terprise, and does not reect the reciprocal interaction that characterizes a
typical sex encounter between two partners.7 Precisely because robot-sex
does not amount to either masturbation or sex between consenting adults,
one needs to address its particular ethical implications.
The second worry is that the instrumentalist approach allows for
downplaying the risk of addiction inherent in interacting with robots that
can perceive and immediately cater to their partner’s every need. Consider
how Levy describes that “robots will be programmable never to fall out of
love with their human, and they will be able to ensure that their human
never falls out of love with them” and “your robot’s emotion detection
system will continuously monitor the level of your aection for it, and as
that level drops, your robot will experiment with changes in behaviour
until its appeal to you has reverted to normal” (D. Levy, 2007a, p. 118). This
sounds like the perfect gambling machine, which constantly updates its
rules according to its user’s desires – though these robots are potentially
far more addictive than any currently existing gambling machine. We think
this issue is insuciently addressed by instrumentalist approaches such as
Levy’s, because, if one thinks of robots as merely neutral tools, as he does,
then any risk of addiction rests solely on the shoulders of the user and not
on a robot or its designers. However, it is an open question whether this is
how robot-sex will be experienced by human users (or their signicant
others). Rather, we suggest that robots are not merely neutral tools.
A convincing argument in this regard is provided by Peter-Paul Ver-
beek (2011), who argues that for instance an obstetric ultrasound is not
merely a neutral tool, a ‘looking glass’ into the womb. Its use raises im-
7 This also illustrates that robot-sex is not or need not always be wrong. This would be as
extravagant a claim as the suggestion that masturbation is always wrong.
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portant ethical questions, like “What will we do when it looks like our
unborn child has Down syndrome?” or social pressure such as “Why did
you decide to let the child [with Down syndrome] be born, given that you
knew and you could have avoided it?”, or more general societal questions
like “Is it desirable that ultrasonography leads to a rise of abortions because
of less severe defects like a harelip?” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 27). This shows that
the use of obstetric ultrasound inuences our moral domain. It is naive to
think that using technologies would not shape our behaviour and societal
practices. Instead, it is better to think about this shaping of behaviour
while designing technology. Similarly, instead of seeing robots as neutral
tools, we should acknowledge that, for instance, robots may evoke more
emotions in us than other tools do, as Matthias Scheutz (2012) suggests.
More importantly perhaps, the design and use of intimate robots presup-
pose or establish certain practices concerning ‘appropriate intimacy.’ At
the very least, these practices and their underlying assumptions should be
elucidated.
Two conclusions can be drawn from the above account. First, humans
and technologies should not be seen as separately existing entities, with
technology providing neutral products for human consumption. Secondly,
ethical analyses are not based on pre-given ideas or criteria, but need to
re-evaluate how human-artefact interaction may be inuenced or radically
changed by new technologies. This means that stakeholders participating
in the design of technologies have a responsibility both in considering how
their products will shape human behaviour and reecting on the ethical
issues that may arise with the use of their product.
On this view, designers are “practical ethicists, using matter rather
than ideas as a medium of morality” (Verbeek, 2011, p. 90). In this frame-
work there is room for the moral aspects of technologies in a pragmatic
context, without it becoming a ‘thou shalt not’-like ethics. A virtue-ethical
approach is exactly what the topic of intimate relations with robots needs,
because interacting with a robot as an articial partner is, even more so
than with a regular artefact, a relationship which intimately shapes our
own dispositional behaviour and societal views as well. On rst sight, Levy
seems open to a more interactive view when he refers to Sherry Turkle,
taking up her line of thought in saying that he “is certain that robots will
transform human notions” including “notions of love and sexuality” (D.
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Levy, 2007a, p. 15). The way Levy discusses situatedness resonates with
the notions that humans and technologies should not be seen as strictly
separate entities and that certain concepts are not pre-given but arise out
of interaction between humans and artefacts. Does that mean Levy has
successfully anticipated critique along the lines we have set out? It does
not.
Although Levy seems sensitive to the two notions mentioned, in prac-
tice it is merely a lip-service to interactive human–technology approaches.
His instrumentalist treatment of human–robot relations deals with humans
and robots in terms of isolated atoms with only a one-way connection
between them, from user to robot, without any consideration of the larger
reciprocal interactive eects on behaviour and social practices. He does
not analyse robot-sex in terms of the structures and situatedness he earlier
described. Any instrumentalist framework will focus on the human, sub-
ject side of things and portray robots as neutral artefacts to be used. What
Levy describes is a trend of an increasing acceptation of robot sex, not
how it would actually constitute or change (our conceptions of) sex or
intimate relationships. Even if one agrees that masturbation is not cheating
– an open question, likely to be inuenced by many contextual factors –
that does not necessarily mean that having sex with a robot will not be
considered as cheating. An intelligent android functions on a distinctively
dierent level of companionship than, say, a vibrator. More dramatically, if
instrumentalist thinkers on the one hand argue that an intimate relation-
ship with a robot is possible and imply that these kinds of relationships
can be as intense and realistic as intimate relationships between humans,
then they should agree that being intimate with such a robot, while in a
relationship with someone else, could be construed as cheating. At the
very least, one has to concede that robot-sex in such a scenario cannot
simply be equated to masturbation. In other words, even assuming that one
would nd it hard to imagine someone being jealous about one’s partner
using a vibrator, one could still imagine jealousy plays a role when one’s
partner engages in sexual activities with a very human-looking and acting
robot.8
8 The Swedish science-ction television drama Äkta människor (Real humans, 2012) depicts
an example of this when the relationship between Therese (Camilla Larsson) and her
husband turns sour because he grows jealous of her ‘hubot’ – a humanoid robot capable
of exactly the functions Levy discusses. This depiction is ctional of course, but the force
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The analysis we have given shows that instrumentalist approaches
may leave crucial ethical considerations unaddressed. Notions of love and
sex will be changed by the development of humanlike robots. But how will
these notions change? If we can have sex robots which are “always willing,
always ready to please and to satisfy, and totally committed” (D. Levy,
2007a, p. 229), what will that do to the way we view relationships? An
understanding of robot-sex not as instrumental, neutral use of tools, but
as involving a reciprocal interaction between human agents, robots and
their designers is required to develop adequate answers to questions such
as these. This is where virtue ethics can provide a guide for evaluation of
such interactions.
3.3 Consent practice through robots in therapy
In order to investigate how sex robots could make a positive contribution
to human moral character, we draw on virtue ethics for ideas on how
to cultivate virtues and connect those to insights from current empirical
data provided by literature on robotics and psychology. Our aim is to
avoid the problem of cultivating vices through repeated unnegotiated
practice – such as illustrated by Sparrow. Indeed, well designed robots may
create the possibility to actually improve attitudes and behavioural habits
regarding sex. First, consider the human–sex robot rape play scenario again.
Previously, we argued that what is problematic about this scenario is not
the act between consenting adults itself, but the potential normalization
of behaviour it could lead to. For instance, the human participant may
become accustomed to immediate satisfaction of desires through the use
of a human-looking object and might extend the involved behavioural
patterns to objectify other humans.
One way of preventing unwanted behavioural patterns is by providing
sex robots with a module that can initiate a consent scenario. Like con-
senting humans, a robot and its human partner will have to communicate
carefully about the kind of interaction that will take place and the human
will be confronted by the subject-like appearance and the behaviour of
the robot. And like in a relationship between humans, this communica-
of the story at least casts doubt on any outright dismissal of the possibility that humans
will become jealous of robots.
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tion could potentially result in the robot sometimes not consenting and
terminating the interaction. Such interaction with a robot might prevent
the practice of unidirectional behavioural habits and a resulting increased
objectication of other humans.9 This consideration suggests that the po-
tential psychological and behavioural benets of a consent-module will
make it at least worthy of investigation. One should notice too, however,
that a consent-module may negatively aect the potential economic gains
of sex-robot producers, a consequence that is not our main concern here.
Second, there are potential benets with respect to sex practice and cul-
tural perception in general in the consent-module, namely in cultivating
the virtue of compassion. Though we focus on compassion for the sake of
limiting the scope of this case study, other virtues, such as respect, likely
ought to play a role in consent-practice as well. We take compassion here
as the ability to care for and open up to another person without losing sight
of one’s own needs and feelings. Virtuous displays of compassion strike
the right balance between care for others and for oneself. Compassion can
motivate a desire to help others and we take it to be related to, though
distinct from, empathy (see Goetz, Keltner & Simon-Thomas, 2010).
A robot equipped with a consent-module could potentially be used to
investigate ways of improving consent practice in general. Often, partners
communicate their willingness to engage in sex through nonverbal cues
(Byers & Heinlein, 1989). Yet, because nonverbal cues can be ambiguous,
miscommunication can and does occur (Abbey, 1991b). In response, some
governmental institutions have advocated the need for active, verbal con-
sent. The practice of active consent has been met by at least two problems.
First, even verbal consent does not necessarily mean that a partner is freely
engaging in sex, because, for example, social pressure or substance abuse
may be involved (Lim & Rolo, 1999). Second, explicit consent has met
with cultural resistance, as men and women generally believe discussing
9 On the other hand, one might argue, as Sparrow does, that a non-consenting robot
could potentially facilitate (the representation of) rape scenarios even more if the human
partner ignores the robot’s consent. We do not have a solution for that problem here
(although, for example, a simple ‘complete close-and-shutdown’ routine might be an
option), but it is a main reason why we later in this chapter suggest to test this kind of
human–robot interaction in a therapeutic setting rst, as testing under supervision may
give us new insights on how to potentially deal with issues such as these. In any case, we
are not convinced that this argument is sucient to not further investigate the potential
benets of consenting robots.
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consent decreases the chance that sex will occur (Humphreys, 2004). Still,
active consent is seen as a crucial way of combating sexual assault and
rape, for example, at college campuses (Abbey, 1991a; Banyard et al., 2007;
Borges, Banyard & Moynihan, 2008). There is a need to change perceptions
and practice, especially by men (Adams-Curtis & Forbes, 2004), concerning
healthy consent and sexual practices. Virtuous sex robots – supervised
– might help facilitate a much needed cultural change in this regard by
further investigating ways of navigating consent.
The advantage of using sex robots over traditional top-down educa-
tion is that the robots can provide a kind of embodied training that helps
adolescents in negotiating sexual consent. Interaction with a compassion-
cultivating sex robot could raise awareness of how these scenarios could
play out and alter behaviour through training. A sex robot which not
only can practise consent scenarios with a human partner, but which can
actually cultivate a virtue like compassion could potentially be used in sex
education and therapy. A robot cannot suer and so any moral harm dur-
ing education or training will be minimized. It seems to us that compassion
is a suitable virtue to be practised using sex robots in sex education and
therapy. If successful in clinical trials, such robots can be used to support
a change in perception and behaviour of consensual sex on a larger scale,
and not just with adolescents.
One might be sceptical as to whether robots can facilitate a dependable
long-term change in compassion – both in negative or positive ways. It
seems reasonable not to judge this prematurely, as assessing the long-term
eects of sexual human-robot interactions requires empirical investigation
by sexologists and psychologists. A number of interesting experiments
on the inuence of social robots on human behaviour in more general
terms, have been done in the lab of Nicholas Christakis. In one (virtual)
experiment (Shirado & Christakis, 2017), humans were placed into groups
which had to perform a task. Unknown to the participants, these groups
also contained robot agents. The robotic agents were programmed to
make occasional mistakes which adversely inuenced group performance.
This behaviour led to the human participants who collaborated directly
with a robot, to become more exible in nding solutions that beneted
group performance. Similarly, a related experiment (Traeger, Sebo, Jung,
Scassellati & Christakis, 2019) reported that humans who collaborated on
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a task with robots which made occasional mistakes and acknowledged
their mistakes with an apology, became more social, laughing together
more often, and more conversational.
The design of virtuous sex robots requires thinking about a setting
in which to test and apply them. A case study will give the constraints
necessary for the design to be specic and feasible. We further think that
building a robot which can operate in long-term intimate relations in
general rst requires at least building a robot which can operate on a
smaller timescale with a specic target audience. Furthermore, it would be
necessary to have the support of supervisors – next to the AI researchers
which should of course also be involved – that have professional training
in psychology or psychiatry. We therefore propose to start with testing
virtuous sex robots in a therapeutic setting.
As the specic target audience or participants, we suggest to consider
persons who have been diagnosed with a narcissistic personality disorder
(NPD) as the common medical understanding of NPD (American Psychi-
atric Association, 2013a) aligns well with the previously given denition
of compassion. We propose to consider NPD patients who are already
within a therapeutic setting, as this means that testing can be done in a
controlled environment, under supervision of professionals in psychiatry,
psychology, and sexology. The robot’s design, testing and development
beforehand should involve these same professionals, especially regarding
the potential eects of a robot’s refusal of certain kinds of interaction.
The anticipated link with compassion can be found in the latest edition
of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).
In it, narcissism is described as a “pervasive pattern of grandiosity, need
for admiration, and lack of empathy” (American Psychiatric Association,
2013a). Nine indicators are listed for narcissistic behaviour, of which the
third, fth, and sixth are of special interest for us here. Respectively, those
indicators are about the narcissist feeling special, being exploitative in so-
cial relations, and lacking empathy. If compassion as a virtue is the golden
mean between two extremes, then it seems that the narcissist, who feels
better than others and is self-obsessed, is at one extreme of the spectrum.10
10 In the spirit of virtue ethics, one could consider Dependent Personality Disorder (DPD)
to be the other extreme on the compassion spectrum (American Psychiatric Association,
2013a):
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We would describe this extreme (or vice) as having the tendency to being
overly involved with oneself. Hence, training the virtue of empathy and
compassion would be most relevant for this focus group. Designing and
evaluating a robot aimed at inuencing the behaviour of persons is the
most prominent, and challenging, task to be set. Though there is a lack
of information on successful NPD treatments (Dhawan, Kunik, Oldham
& Coverdale, 2010), there is some preliminary evidence that empathic
treatments of those with NPD have positive eects (Bender, 2012).
Obviously, operationalizing our proposal requires careful testing be-
fore the possibility of actual use in training is even considered, as the care
for patients and the safety of those potentially harmed by their conduct
is paramount. One potential worry might be, for example, that people
with narcissistic tendencies become more procient in their manipula-
tions. Therefore, professionals involved would need to closely monitor
the patients and signal such possible undesired eects. These cautionary
words notwithstanding, the potential support of compassionate robots for
NPD treatments is in line with the aforementioned preliminary evidence
(Bender, 2012) and worth further investigation.
The next step in making the robot ready to teach compassion is
by training it to give basic responses to certain kinds of behaviour. As
proposed before, this could be done by training it on recordings of how
compassionate people respond to dierent kinds of (inappropriate) be-
haviour. This means the robot has to recognize at least one extreme on
the compassion spectrum in terms of behaviour of its partner, and has
to perform behaviour appropriate to what it observes. Figuring out what
good identiers of those extremes are and what responses work best will
need to draw heavily on the expertise of the psychiatrists involved.
Compassion is considered here as the virtue which lies between the
extremes of only caring about oneself, the narcissist, or of only caring
about another person. That means that a robot designed to treat these
kinds of disorders should be able to direct behaviour towards the middle
They are willing to submit to what others want, even if the demands are
unreasonable. Their need to maintain an important bond will often result
in imbalanced or distorted relationships. They may make extraordinary
self-sacrices or tolerate verbal, physical, or sexual abuse.
It would be interesting to investigate how love and sex robots could be relevant for
training and therapy for members of this group as well.
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of the spectrum, where there can be a healthy focus on both caring for
oneself and caring for others. We suggest that it may be worthwhile to
investigate whether and how such behaviours could be inuenced by a
compassionate robot. If this turns out to have promising results, work can
be done on improving the design and expanding the use of such robots for
other settings and for other groups of people.
3.4 Implications of virtuous sex robots
We have striven to demonstrate that virtue ethics provides a useful frame-
work for analysing the implications of sex robots, as well as for making re-
commendations for the design and application of such robots. We consider
robot-sex as involving and supporting a reciprocal interaction between
human agents and robots instead of as a form of uni-directional instru-
mental tool use. Applying virtue ethics led us to suggest a consent-module
for sex robots that could support the development or strengthening of
compassion in supervised, therapeutic scenarios. As such, sex robots may
contribute to the cultivation of virtues in humans. However, virtue ethics
does come at a price. In addition to its potential of providing an interesting
perspective on the issues surrounding sex robots, it may also raise new
problems. As an illustration of the latter, we would like to briey reect
on two implications of implementing a consent-module. Robots saying
‘no’ towards the human that uses or owns them can lead to at least two
related principled problems and one big practical challenge.
First, robots that refuse to comply with the demands or wishes of
human beings may obstruct a person’s autonomy, for example, as expressed
by someone’s immediate or long-term desires (see for a eld study in the
context of service robots for elderly Bedaf, Draper, Gelderblom, Sorell &
de Witte, 2016). Second, there is the threat of a responsibility gap. Finally,
there is the practical challenge of how to design such a consent-module.
We will oer some minor suggestions to address the latter at the end of
this section.
We will illustrate the problem of a user’s autonomy by considering
a simple example in a dierent context. Imagine a beer robot, a simple
system that keeps a stock of beers cooled and that brings one on demand.
Obviously, at some point this might result in intoxication of the person
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demanding the beer. To what extent should a (‘virtuous’) beer robot be
enabled to refuse the demands for another beer? Even though the con-
sequences of intoxication may be bad for the persons themselves, as long
as no one else or no one else’s property is hurt, one might conclude that it
is an expression of a person’s autonomy to keep the beers coming. It is only
or at least primarily in the context of negative eects for other persons
or legal agents, that one could morally or legally preclude someone from
having their wishes gratied. So, on the one hand, the human should be
in control, but at some point or in certain contexts it could be legitimate
or morally acceptable to limit the amount of control a human may have.
Regarding the responsibility gap, the problem is that when a human
instructs a well-functioning robot to do something, and the robot is pro-
grammed to refuse to follow the instructions, all kinds of consequences
may follow from that refusal for which the human, in essence, cannot or
need not be held responsible. This leads to the question: Who would be
responsible or accountable for any damages, psychological or physical,
that may ensue? Of course, problems regarding the consequences of saying
‘no’ are not specic to virtue ethics. Rather, they are a consequence of
any view that implies that robots under certain conditions should refuse
specic instructions. However, this is worth discussing here because our
analysis of virtue ethics leads to proposal of a consent-module, and its
consequences should be noted. In our brief discussion, we will try to focus
as much as possible on the specic nature of the ensuing problems in the
context of sex robots.
In order to address these issues of autonomy and responsibility, we
suggest considering the principle of ‘meaningful human control’. This
principle has been discussed in the contexts of military robots and self-
driving cars. The principle states that ultimately humans should remain in
control and carry (ultimate) responsibility for robot decisions and actions
(Article 36, 2015). However, it is far from clear what this principle amounts
to in practice, that is, what the requirements are for the robot so that it
is capable of enabling this principle. Filippo Santoni de Sio and Jeroen
van den Hoven (2018) indicate that humans merely ‘being in the loop’ or
controlling some parameters may be insucient for meaningful control if
other parameters turn out to be more relevant to the robot’s use or if the
human lacks enough information to appropriately inuence the process.
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In addition, possessing an adequate psychological capacity for (assessing)
appropriate action is required for meaningful control, as is, thirdly, an
adequate (legal) framework for assessing responsibility for consequences.
Santoni de Sio and van den Hoven then analyse meaningful control in
terms of John Fischer and Mark Ravizza’s (1998) theory of guidance con-
trol. Guidance control is realized when the decisional mechanism leading
up to a particular behaviour is “moderately reason-responsive”, meaning
that in the case of good reasons to act (or not), the agent can understand
these reasons and decide to act (or not), at least in several dierent relev-
ant contexts. Moreover, the decision-making mechanism should be “the
agent’s own”, in the sense that there are no excusing factors such as being
manipulated, drugged, or disordered.
This, admittedly brief, consideration of meaningful guidance control
provides a criterion that might be useful for the consent-module. It provides
ground to think that when a human does not possess sucient guidance
control, or, by robot compliance with human instructions, may lose such
control, a robot could be justied in non-compliance. This leads to two
questions that need to be answered before a virtuous sex robot can be
enabled with a consent-module, allowing it to refuse commands:
1. Is the person giving the current command in a state of meaningful
human control?
2. Will complying with the current command lead to a reduction of
meaningful human control, such that (1) is no longer the case?
In relation to the rst question, the beer robot could make use of
relatively reliable physiological measurements (like breath or blood ana-
lyses), or behavioural observations (like slurred speech or coordination
diculties). It will be more dicult to gure out which input patterns
might engage the consent-module to generate refusals. Here too, the ex-
pertise of psychologists and psychiatrists, in relation to NPD for instance,
is required. The main suggestion here is that a DSM-5 classied disorder
in itself constitutes a reason for at least considering the possibility that the
ability to act reasonably and compassionately might be aected, or that
sound judgement and behavioural control might be impaired. Practically
speaking, it would be relevant to investigate the extent to which data
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acquisition methods related to emotion recognition and sexual harassment
might apply. Among potential indicators one could think of, for example,
the human’s lack of allowing turn-taking in communication, tone of voice
and body posture, neglect of robotic non-verbal signals of non-interest,
and so on (see, e.g., Miranda, Canabal, Portela García & Lopez-Ongil, 2011;
Rituerto-González, Mínguez-Sánchez, Gallardo-Antolín & Peláez-Moreno,
2019). As a second step, investigations regarding the applicability of ma-
chine learning techniques are relevant (e.g., Fernandes, Cardoso & Astrup,
2018).
The second question points to a dierence between the case of the
beer robot and the virtuous sex robot. In case of the beer robot, a prediction
about the intoxication can be made on the basis of physiological variables.
Given certain physiological aspects, the time course of the intoxication
can be inferred with reasonable, and legally satisfactory, certainty. An in-
toxication level close to life-threatening alcohol-poisoning, just to mention
a relatively clear case, could result in justiable robot non-compliance.
However, in the case of the virtuous sex robot such a prediction about
the consequences of (non-)compliance is not as straightforward. For this
reason too, it bears emphasis that we are suggesting the investigation of
the consent-module within clinical contexts. Assuming, for the moment,
agreement regarding the appropriateness of a robot’s non-compliance
in certain situations, there is still a further question about how the non-
compliance should be put into eect. We just mention a few possibilities
here. One option is that a robot may refuse to comply, provide an explan-
ation in terms of its assessment of the potential negative consequences,
and provide information aimed at improved self-understanding and self-
control. Ideally, this could result in a retraction of the instruction given.
Another option may be that the robot refuses and informs a support group
of, say, signicant others or therapists. A more extreme option would be
that the robot refuses and stops functioning altogether, by way of an emer-
gency close-and-shutdown operation. Finally, it is worth noting that we
may need to stretch our concepts of autonomy and responsibility beyond
the individual and recast them in terms of open-ended and ecological pro-
cesses (see Clark, 2007). Unfortunately, picking up this topic lies beyond
the scope of the present chapter.
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Undoubtedly, many other issues and ways of addressing them sur-
round the notion of a consent-module. We have explicated the present ones
to emphasize that virtue ethics does not provide easy solutions. Rather, it
opens up a research domain in itself, one that comes with its own set of
promises and diculties that will need to be addressed.
3.5 Next design steps
The eld of robotics advances rapidly and robot ethics ought to keep up. In
the foreseeable future, there will be robots advanced enough to evoke, even
if only for a few minutes, the experience in humans that they are interacting
with another human being. Unless a ban is implemented (Richardson,
2016), which we do not want to rule out, it is likely that love and sex
relationships with robots will be formed. How can we best understand
and evaluate such relationships? We have taken some initial steps towards
answering this question by arguing that virtue ethics is better suited than
instrumentalist approaches to evaluate the subtleties of intimate human-
robot relationships. Next steps should involve careful testing and with this
in mind we have outlined how testing a consent-module for robots in a
therapeutic setting may yield useful insights. Importantly, implications
for user autonomy and responsibility should remain in focus of future
research.
Some challenges are anticipated. First, the misuse of sex robots could
have a lasting impression on an adolescent learning about intimate rela-
tionships, but there is also a positive side to developing realistic looking
and acting love robots. Such robots could train people how to behave con-
dently and respectfully in intimate relationships. In a therapeutic setting,
such robots could be used to improve empathy or increase self-love in
persons with respectively narcissistic or dependent personality disorders.
Another challenge is society’s response to sex robots. It is dicult if
not impossible to predict how our conceptions of love and sex will change
with the introduction of love robots. One risk here is that a potential
societal taboo on love and sex with robots would lead to fringe behaviours
and scenes, similar to the domain of drugs and prostitution. It is therefore
important that the topic of sex-robots, challenging, exciting, or revolting
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as it may appear to dierent parties, remains open for investigation and
discussion.
The implications of developing love and sex robots are potentially
huge and we have striven to tentatively chart one path, a virtue theoretical
approach, within this domain. Advances in other robotic elds, like care
robots or military robots, might have analogous implications. In these
areas too, we should avoid the mistake of assuming that robots will not
change the way we view healthcare and warfare. On the contrary, we
need to consider and assess which of these changes would be desirable or
should be avoided. In any case, we would do well to avoid the suggestion
that all these developments are necessarily bad. We suggest that there is
the possibility, worthy to be investigated, that some changes might be for
the good. When we realize that the way we design and use such robots
is bound to aect us, we can think about ways of improving ourselves
through the technology, by careful consideration and monitoring.
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Concluding remarks
In the present dissertation, I have contributed to the development of an
enactive account of mind–technology interaction. This has been motivated
by recent discussions in philosophy of mind & cognition by a growing
number of scholars who advocate a pragmatic turn towards cognition
as action-oriented and dynamic. The pragmatic turn moves away from
accounts that, inspired by the computer metaphor, conceive of cognition
as relying on representations and information-processing. Within this
debate, functionalism is often seen as the main champion of the latter kind
of theories, while enactivism is heralded as part of the former. A special
kind of functionalism, one that departs from the extended mind thesis, is
currently the dominant theory when it comes to understanding mind and
technology. Current theories on enactivism have not yet yielded a mature
theory about the specics of embodied technology engagements and so
an examination of mind–technology interaction within the context of the
pragmatic turn is a life issue for enactivists. Therefore, if this dissertation
is to bear fruit, it has to be shown that its contributions move the enactivist
programme closer – or beyond – its functionalist rival and further support
the pragmatic turn in cognition.
The rst step towards an enactivist account of mind and technology
has been the building of a bridge between enactivism and philosophy
of technology in Chapter 1. From the eld of philosophy of technology,
postphenomenology was presented as a potential partner to enactivism by
establishing their common ground. This common ground is most clear in
their shared assumption that mind is to be understood as co-constituted by
both agential and environmental factors. Enactivism and postphenomen-
ology have been shown to be of mutual theoretical benet through two
steps. First, by discussing how the postphenomenological division of the
six kinds of human–technology relations can inform enactivist research
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on mind–technology interaction. Second, by exposing how enactivism
may provide a cognitive underpinning to postphenomenological research.
Following up on the general issues outlined in the rst chapter,
Chapter 2 considered a concrete case-study for a critical comparison of
functionalism and enactivism. In line with the pragmatic turn, this case-
study examined how functionalist and enactivist theories fare with respect
to operationalizing the memory palace mnemonic in virtual reality. Suppor-
ted by a critical review of the current empirical literature on memory and
mnemonics, I argued that functionalist theories of memory fail to account
for the embodied aspects of the memory palace by their assumption that
cognition is information-processing. In its stead, I developed an enactive
account of the memory palace and oered design recommendations for its
use in virtual reality.
Having discussed the phenomenological and cognitive science as-
pects of enactive technology engagement, Chapters 3 and 4 turned on the
ethical aspects of mind–technology interaction. Chapter 3 cleared ground
by arguing that virtue ethics is highly relevant when it comes to the dis-
cussion of the impact of sex robots. I positioned a virtue ethical analysis
of sex robots against an instrumental use, arguing that the latter fails to
capture crucial implications of sex robot use on human moral character.
The main contribution of this chapter to the literature is its proposal for
the potential positive aspects of sex robot use in therapy. This contribution
leans on the idea that sex robots, when outtted with a consent module
and, crucially, used in supervised therapeutic settings, might contribute
to virtue cultivation. The published paper that this chapter is based on
has already garnered much societal discussion and informed specialists
working in the eld of robotics.
In Chapter 4, I picked up the thread left hanging at the end of the
previous chapter, namely what the connection between virtue ethics and
enactivism is. By using the situationist challenge against virtue ethics as
a foil, I argued for an enactive understanding of human moral character.
This chapter oered a rebuttal of situationism by dissolving the opposition
between moral character, as traditionally constrained to the body, and
environmental factors. Additionally, it has provided a proposal for virtue
cultivation through ‘self-programming’. In doing both, this chapter has
claried slumbering connections between virtue and enaction.
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The principle of multiple realizability, often thought to be a major
trump card for functionalism, provided the stage for a brief reection in
Chapter 5. Because of its emphasis on the concrete materiality of cognitive
acts, enactivism can be thought to be incompatible with the thesis that
cognitive processes can be realized in dierent physical kinds. However,
I have shown that, when we move away from assuming that multiple
realization must necessarily depend on information-processing and allow
for cognition to be realized over parts of the brain, body, and environment,
enactivism can be said to be compatible with multiple realization. This
result oers enactivism extra support in comparisons with functionalism.
The main contributions of this work were informed by a number of
elds and will, potentially, aect them in turn. By drawing on insights
provided by philosophy of technology, cognitive science, and virtue ethics
I have articulated how enactivism may categorise and understand dier-
ent human–technology relations, add to the design of technologies, and
elucidate the moral issues surrounding embodied technology interaction.
This will enable enactivism to better investigate the crucial experiential,
scientic, and ethical issues surrounding mind–technology interaction.
Not only does this oer theoretical benets by informing wider discussions
about the pragmatic turn in cognitive science. It also oers new insights to
engineering research on the embodied aspects of robotics, virtual reality
and the ethical issues surrounding those.
Invariably, a number of questions remain open and I shall briey
discuss the main one here. Whereto can functionalism move to meet the
challenges raised in the present dissertation? It became clear, on a number
of occasions, that through the so-called ‘third wave’ in extended mind,
there might arise an extended functionalism that does not conceive of
cognition as the processing of information. So far, the work on third wave
extended cognition has been largely preliminary, but we can single out
one potential trajectory. In line with the pragmatic turn, the pressure
on functionalists to move away from representations and computational
mechanisms has steadily increased. Combine this observation with the
fact that a growing number of functionalists accept the extended mind
thesis, and the question is raised whether functionalism is on a course of
convergence with enactivism. Given the fact that many theorists, from
both sides, have, on a number of occasions, stated that functionalism
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and enactivism are incompatible, a future discussion of this observed
convergence would be highly relevant and interesting.
I aimed for this dissertation to make a positive contribution to the
vibrant and interesting discussions on mind and technology. Given the
initial uptake of the published papers in this work, I am carefully optimistic
that this aim was at least partially realized. It is my hope that the present
work empowers us to better understand mind–technology interactions,
and, therefore, also ourselves.
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